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‘Cursed is the ground for 
thy sake; in sorrow shall 
thou eat of it all the days 
of thy life; … and thou 
shalt eat the herb of the 
field. In the sweat of thy 
face shalt thou eat bread, 
till thou return unto the 
ground;’ 
Book of Genesis, 
Chapter 3, verses 17-19
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0.0 Abstract
The Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa 
(PEAPA) Programme examines the impact of political 
competition, patronage, and foreign aid on agricultural 
policy outcomes across a sample of eight African 
countries. This report examines the effects of these 
factors on agricultural policy formulation and 
implementation in Tanzania through the lens of two 
initiatives, the Agricultural Sector Development 
Programme (ASDP) and the National Agricultural Input 
Voucher Scheme (NAIVS). The report asks whether 
competitive politics has improved the policy regime for 
rural voters as political parties compete for their support 
and the ruling elite responds to increasing electoral 
pressures to deliver concrete benefits. The broad 
conclusion is that both vote-seeking and patronage 
incentivise agricultural policy but that the benefits to 
voters in terms of private and public goods delivered as 
a result are limited by the same patronage practiced from 
national to local levels. On balance, donor aid supports 
essentially statist policies which serve to marginalise the 
private sector as the ‘engine of growth.’ 
The ASDP (2006-13) is Tanzania’s main agricultural 
policy initiative of the new century. The Programme was 
slow to take off through disagreements between the 
Government of Tanzania and donor agencies, who part-
financed it through basket funding and a World Bank 
soft loan. Donors perceived a heavily state-centred 
development strategy focusing on the provision of public 
goods, a consequent overconcentration of resources for 
central government ministries and their dependent 
parastatals, and a secondary role for markets and private 
actors.
Shortly after the 2005 elections, President Kikwete 
announced an ambitious target for irrigated rice 
production, which then became the main focus of the 
ASDP. A number of donors pulled out of the programme, 
but the WB weighed in with a large project, thus endorsing 
the controversial focus on small-scale irrigation schemes. 
Though there was a clear vote-seeking incentive to the 
President’s initiative, it is likely that the rents created for 
irrigation and other ASDP initiatives were largely 
appropriated by central and local-level elites and private 
actors, though corroborative information is lacking. 
The NAIVS is a clearer example of a vote-seeking 
initiative by the ruling elite. Consisting of input vouchers 
for fertiliser and seeds for maize and rice production, 
NAIVS expanded rapidly in the build-up to the 2010 
elections, with significant support from the WB’s 
Accelerated Food Security Programme (AFSP). In 2010/11, 
NAIVS was scaled up to 74 districts in 20 regions targeting 
around 2,000,000 direct beneficiaries. How many farm 
households actually benefited from the scheme is yet 
to be established, but there is substantial anecdotal 
evidence of patronage and rent-seeking from the centre 
down to the village level influencing actual 
distribution.
In all events, the 2010 elections attracted a very low 
voter turn-out, and the overall showing of the ruling party 
fell significantly nationwide, suggesting that voters are 
beginning to respond to the government’s perceived 
poor performance in creating public goods and services 
and delivering on electoral promises. The continued lack 
of widespread benefits to farmers increases the likelihood 
of deepening voter disenchantment with the current 
ruling elite and of growing challenges to Tanzania’s 
inclusive political settlement.
While stimulating some useful policy debate, the WB 
and other donors have been unsuccessful in addressing 
institutional constraints on policy implementation, while 
lack of coordination has contributed to systematic project 
failure in the agricultural sector. The two initiatives 
examined in this report are examples of the tendency 
of donors to finance policies and practices that do not 
meet their formal market-based principles or fail on 
practical grounds. We conclude that, in the final analysis, 
national interests trump donor attempts to exert policy 
leverage. Aid serves the political purposes of the ruling 
elite.
Local agribusiness and trade cartels have flourished 
since trade liberalisation, influencing trade in fertiliser, 
food aid, sugar and rice, tractors and power tillers, and 
limiting market entry for new aspirant players. The 
significance of these interests for agricultural policy has 
yet to be explored.
Possible forces for change in the existing policy regime 
include the gradual emergence of a class of commercial 
farmers, growing external strategic and commercial 
interests in acquiring land for biofuel and food production 
for export, and a plethora of initiatives by philanthro-
capitalists and international agencies to deliver the green 
revolution, food security, and poverty reduction. It 
remains to be seen how these new forces will influence 
the existing political settlement. 
The report concludes that patronage and rent-seeking 
undermine official policies designed to deliver public or 
private goods to voters, with both public and private 
sector interests informally capturing the lion’s share of 
the rents created. What proportion of these rents is 
invested in production rather than dissipated in 
consumption is not known. Key future research and data 
needs are flagged in the final section.
1.0 Background and 
rationale
The gradual insertion of Tanzanian farm households 
into global commodity markets that began before 
colonial rule was reversed after a few years of 
independence, when the ruling party began to implement 
policies that proved to be inimical to sustained export 
growth on capitalist lines.1 Declining terms of trade and 
depressed prices for export crops, together with 
inefficient state-controlled input and produce markets 
forced many export-crop growing households to switch 
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to maize and other crops for subsistence and cash. 
Households diversified their livelihoods by turning to 
non-agricultural activities, including trade, services, 
casual wage labour and mining. After two decades of 
deepening crisis, the Tanzanian economy eventually 
stabilised in the 1990s, but ‘traditional’ export agriculture 
has not prospered overall as a result of marketing reforms. 
Food production has more or less kept pace with 
population growth largely through the extension of 
cultivation rather than through productivity gains.2  In 
drought years, the government still imports food.3
Fifty years after independence much of Tanzanian 
agriculture remains small-scale, undercapitalised and 
labour-intensive.  Population growth, declining soil 
fertility, and (in some places) HIV-AIDS have undermined 
rural living standards. The ‘green revolution’ that has been 
promised more than once is yet to appear. A recent review 
concluded that:
‘Weak incentives and low agricultural 
growth have left Tanzanian farmers in a 
severely de-capitalized state. They own 
very few productive assets, and are ill 
equipped to bring about an acceleration 
of agricultural growth.’ 4
Although the main notional object of the official policy 
narrative on poverty reduction and food security, the 
millions of small-scale Tanzanian ‘farming’ households 
have very little direct influence on national policy making. 
The majority of rural households remain relatively 
autonomous of the state as both recipients of state-
provided services (public goods) or other private benefits, 
or as taxpayers.5 
Numerous explanations for the lack of agricultural 
transformation have been proposed. These may be 
classified as structuralist, state failure, market failure and 
policy failure. Structuralist arguments stress declining 
terms of trade for primary produce reflecting falling 
prices for traditional exports and rising prices of fertiliser 
and other chemical inputs. Subsidies to farmers in Europe, 
America and Japan keep certain commodity prices 
depressed and dumping of these products undermines 
local producers in poor countries.6
Market failure arguments focus on the difficulties 
involved in deepening markets among low-density 
populations in rain-dependent 7 agricultural systems that 
offer weak commercial opportunities for either farmers 
or external actors. The transaction costs and risks involved 
in expanding markets are prohibitive for both private 
investors and the state. Risk reduction strategies lead 
farm households to maintain a strong subsistence focus 
so as to avoid food shortages, or famine.  Smallholder 
households that are already involved in commercial 
markets are vulnerable to market failures at the local, 
national or international levels. The post 2008 global 
credit crisis is a case in point.
State failure theories inspired structural adjustment 
in the mid-1980s and beyond. These propose that 
potential market-led growth is undermined by excessive 
and inefficient state involvement in agricultural input 
and output markets, leading to the erosion of price 
incentives to smallholders and their shift to other crops 
and non-agricultural informal activities (petty trade, 
mining, casual wage labour). Reducing barriers to local 
and external trade, establishing macro-economic balance 
and providing positive price signals to producers are the 
policy corner-stones for turning agriculture around. The 
state failure discourse is linked to the democratisation 
and good governance/corruption control discourses that 
see the creation of western-style institutions as the 
precondition for economic transformation. These 
discourses have been challenged by critics arguing that 
neither western democracies nor more recent successful 
transformers were based on the model described 
above.8
Last, policy failure suggests inability to formulate 
policies that the state has the human and financial 
resources to implement and a ‘disconnect’ between 
policy formulators and implementers. Hyden argues that 
the policy environment ‘lacks the instruments that allow 
policy makers to make a difference.’ 9 After independence, 
policy making developed four main features. First, there 
was a ‘strong urge to do everything and do it at once.’ 
Policies became ‘frontal attacks’, ‘operations’ and ‘matters 
of life or death.’ Second, ‘policy makers often decided on 
matters without first having obtained full and detailed 
knowledge of the possible consequences of their 
decisions.’ Third, policy makers were unwilling ‘to use the 
past as a source of guidance for the future.’ Last, public 
sector officials ‘work in a context where public 
expectations constantly exceed what can ... be 
attained...’10
We do not intend to undertake a detailed critique of 
these positions, each of which has its strengths and 
weaknesses, but none of which can be expected to 
capture the whole story.11  The persistence of widespread 
rural poverty suggests that the Government of Tanzania 
(GoT) has succeeded in crafting neither state- nor market-
driven solutions to the problem of agricultural 
transformation. Since structural adjustment, the 
Tanzanian state has not embraced market-driven 
strategies  to address  chronic  pover ty  and 
underdevelopment with any conviction or consistency.12 
This paper focuses on policy failure by examining the 
dynamics of policy formulation and implementation 
within a state-dominated policy regime. We consider the 
contribution of aid to policy failure. New external 
influences on ‘policy’ have been largely left out of the 
mix, though they are dealt with briefly in section 5.2. 
Low factor productivity in Tanzanian agriculture is 
reflected in high levels of food and income poverty.13  A 
generally depressed rural economy has driven livelihood 
diversification and migration.  Bryceson employs the 
terms ‘depeasantisation’ and ‘deagrarianisation’ to capture 
the type of agricultural change that has taken place 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa during the last half 
century.14  Ellis and others have shown that both ‘rich’ 
and ‘poor’ farm households engage in a variety of off-farm 
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commercial activities to reduce farming-related risks.15 
The proportion of adults involved in agriculture has fallen 
significantly as former or would-be farmers seek or create 
non-agricultural, largely informal, off-farm employment 
opportunities. Farming and fishing accounted for 78 
percent of male employment in 1991, falling to 70 percent 
in 2001. For females the figures were 85 and 73 percent 
respectively. In both years women made up 55 percent 
of the agricultural labour force.16  Finally, whereas at 
independence in 1961, 95 percent of Tanzanians lived 
in rural areas, by 2004, well over a third of Tanzanians (37 
percent) were urban.17 These figures suggest that 
providing the rapidly growing urban population with its 
basic staple (maize) and other wage goods constitutes 
a major success for Tanzanian agriculture over the last 
half century.18  
Yet it would be wrong to conclude that as a result of 
poor policies and deagrarianisation there are no 
commercial farmers or (more or less) semi-subsistence 
smallholders who are responsive to market signals and 
opportunities. First, there are large farms and estates in 
the country, and their number is likely to increase in 
future.19 Second, though firm evidence is lacking, there 
are signs that a class of medium- to large-scale Tanzanian 
farmers is beginning to emerge, a trend already noted 
by Putterman in the mid-1990s.20  Third, there are also 
numerous examples of small-scale producers responding 
positively to improved market signals during the post-
liberalisation period, either by expanding production of 
established crops or experimenting with new ones.21 
Lastly, successful outgrower schemes (sugar, tea, 
horticulture) or producer-processor value chain initiatives 
(cashew, tobacco, coffee) have gone counter to the 
deagrarianisation trend.  
This study examines agricultural policy making and 
implementation in the Agriculture Sector Development 
Programme (ASDP) and the National Agricultural Inputs 
Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) in order to better understand 
the dynamics of policy formulation and downstream 
consequences.
2.0  Methodology and 
research questions
The breadth and focus of agricultural policies, variety 
of potential beneficiaries of such policies and multiple 
sources of influence on policy making and implementation 
complicate the discussion of agricultural ‘policy’ and force 
us to make some hard choices on research priorities. We 
also have to consider the possible benefits derived from 
policy that we might usefully study since there is a 
widespread sense that policies are not implemented as 
planned, benefits are meagre or unevenly distributed, 
and often not sustained after the conclusion of the 
mechanism that deliver them to farmers.
The Future Agricultures Consortium’s PEAPA (Political 
Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa) programme 
approaches agricultural policy as potentially emanating 
from two main sources: the formal political process and 
informal patronage.22  In a competitive electoral system, 
ruling elites may initiate policies targeting specific 
constituencies, including the rural population who 
constitute a majority of voters, and particular subgroups 
who may be potential swing voters or defectors.23  The 
extent to which ruling elites may be prepared to commit 
scarce resources to the provision of community and 
private benefits in order to retain or secure electoral 
support depends on a number of factors, explored further 
below.
We know that historically Tanzania’s rural population 
has been more likely to use avoidance tactics than 
resistance or protest (collective action) when confronted 
by state power.24 In the current competitive political 
context, has the state become more benign in its dealings 
with farmers than in the past?  Have farmers become 
more organised and assertive in furthering their collective 
interests as a result of political competition and state 
policies of participation and empowerment?  Do longer-
term, underlying factors limit the impact of short-term 
changes?25  
The incentives that formal competitive politics present 
to the ruling elite to become more farmer-friendly are 
mediated by the nature of the existing power structure 
and state-civil society-private sector relations. 
Traditionally, Tanzania has been characterised by a high 
degree of inclusion of interest groups within the ruling 
coalition, in which the allocation of rents or rent-making 
opportunities to various interests to solidify the ruling 
coalition has not been excessively costly.  Cooksey (2011) 
argues that the transaction costs of maintaining political 
order have risen rapidly in recent years, and some see 
the growing likelihood that the ruling party, riddled with 
costly and policy-crippling factionalism, will be seriously 
challenged in the 2015 elections. The tendential decline 
of elite solidarity creates the conditions for the deepening 
of a diffuse, rent-seeking elite that pays formal homage 
to an increasingly beleaguered presidency and ruling 
party in disarray. The impact of a weakening elite on 
agricultural policy is difficult to measure, but we speculate 
that ‘increasing relative autonomy’ would best describe 
the strategic powers and privileges of existing (sub-)state 
agencies, including ministry bureaucracies, regional and 
district commissioners, ruling party actors, and relevant 
parastatals, in unmediated26 collaboration with big 
private interests both inside and outside the country.   
It is not easy to assess the extent to which policies 
influence agricultural performance. There are numerous 
policies that impact directly and indirectly on the 
agricultural sector, but it is problematic to attribute 
causality to a single policy strand, since of course multiple 
factors influence short- and longer-term outcomes. 
Identifying definite trends in production, productivity 
and profitability is made more difficult by the well-known 
weaknesses of official statistics and inaccessibility of key 
data.27 The impact of certain policy interventions, for 
example, research and extension, training and capacity 
building, cannot be measured directly. In terms of policy 
with (potentially) measurable state/donor-financed 
deliverables, we would hope to be able to identify both 
Working Paper 040 www.future-agricultures.org7
beneficiaries and benefits. Candidates include irrigation 
schemes, outgrower and contract farming, subsidised 
inputs, and power tillers. Benefits from these are inevitably 
targeted, either formally, for example, focusing fertiliser 
subsidies on certain areas and crops, or informally, when 
benefits with a large potential target group are captured 
by strategically placed individuals and groups. Other 
significant ‘policy’ benefits accrue to importers obtaining 
licences and tax exemptions for routine or emergency 
food imports, generating major rents. 
Official policies target various formal objectives, 
including boosting exports and foreign exchange 
earnings (see below), enhancing national food self-
sufficiency and household food security/poverty 
reduction. In this programme, we are concerned with 
the forces that drive policy towards improving the lot of 
smallholders through the provision of public, private and 
club goods, as opposed to furnishing opportunities for 
patronage and clientelism to sections of the ruling elite, 
or providing rents to commercial interests.28 For reasons 
just mentioned, imputing causality for any policy 
intervention is highly problematic.  Both the GoT and 
donors are prone to claim that policies and supporting 
projects are more or less successful in achieving their 
stated objectives. Below we are at pains to assess claims 
of policy/project success critically, albeit very 
approximately. This impacts on the precision with which 
we address our two research questions, as explained 
below.
Two final prefatory remarks. First, the centrality of 
agriculture in the Tanzanian political economy has 
arguably declined significantly in the post-liberalisation 
period. Falling agricultural exports during the 1970s and 
1980s was a major cause of the country’s growing trade 
deficit and ensuing financial crisis. Liberalisation did not 
bring about the hoped-for revival of ‘traditional’ 
agricultural exports, and Tanzania came to depend 
increasingly on aid to bridge the trade gap. During the 
last 15 years, minerals, tourism and manufactured goods 
have reduced agricultural exports to almost a residual 
category: by 2008, non-agricultural exports accounted 
for 86 percent of total exports by value. Yet agriculture 
still employs about three-quarters of the labour force, 
accounts for a quarter (24 percent) of GDP,29  and continues 
to be politically important from the point of view of 
feeding the towns and assuring food security. The 
distinction between ‘food’ and ‘export’ crops has largely 
disappeared as traditional exports have stagnated and 
maize and other food exports have become important 
in regional markets. The consequences of the decline of 
‘traditional’ agricultural exports on agricultural policy 
have not been explored systematically, and should be 
incorporated in any future work on the political economy 
of agricultural policy. Continued widespread poverty, 
food security and urban food prices are enough key issues 
for politicians to take an interest in the rural 
hinterland. 
Lastly, incentives to appeal to farmers do not necessarily 
denote agricultural policies that make sense from a 
developmental perspective. Short-term electoral gains 
can be achieved through policies providing private or 
club goods to farmers, input subsidies being the example 
explored below, but these are unlikely to be the best use 
of resources from the point of view of long-term 
agricultural growth and transformation. Thus, a move 
from ‘urban’ to ‘rural bias’, through budgetary transfers 
(rents) to rural voters, would not necessarily signify a 
move to a more developmental policy regime. Providing 
concessional loans for such purposes can be interpreted 
as moral hazard.
This report should be thought of as a first look at issues 
which to date political economists have not studied 
adequately.30  It is based on a review of the relevant GoT 
and donor policy documents, the academic literature, 
and interviews with government and donor agency 
officials and consultants. Since donor officials have a rapid 
turn-over rate, a number of key respondents were 
interviewed via email. 
Our two key research questions are presented 
below.
Research question 1: To what extent is agricultural 
policy driven by the ruling coalition’s concern with 
securing the rural vote directly through the ballot 
rather than indirectly through clientelism at national 
and lower levels?
Question 1 targets the political process as a potential 
driver of agricultural policy. A key issue is whether political 
competition, which was reintroduced in Tanzania in the 
early-mid 1990s, has had a beneficial impact on the rural 
population that still constitutes the majority of voters. 
Have post-1995 governments been less heavy-handed 
that their predecessors in dealing with the rural 
population and their problems? Have budgets and 
services increased? Are carrots replacing sticks in the 
policy armoury? Alternatively, has political competition 
heightened pressures for patronage from local political 
elites as a means of delivering votes?
Public spending on agriculture is one indicator of 
political commitment. Though spending has increased 
in absolute and relative terms in recent years, the GoT is 
still a long way from reaching the CAADP target of 10 
percent of public spending. The agricultural budget 
increased from 3.8 percent of the total in 2000 to 4.6 
percent and 6.1percent in 2007/08 and 2009/10, but 
actual transfers in the last two years cited were only 2.3 
percent and 4.9 percent respectively.31 For reasons 
discussed in this report, we should not assume a 
significant positive relationship between public spending, 
service and public goods delivery, and increased in 
agricultural production and productivity.  
A number of policy decisions in recent years could be 
interpreted as offering benefits to rural voters as a means 
of gaining favour and containing the potential appeal 
of opposition parties, including the abolition of the 
development levy in 2003, reduction or abolition of taxes 
and levies on export crops (various years), lifting of export 
bans on maize and other crops (prior to the 2010 
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elections), and the expansion of primary education 
facilities in underserved areas.32 But survey results 
indicate that rural citizens do not see much improvement 
in official services in recent years, with rural roads 
constituting a key failure of official policy.33
Tanzania’s relatively lack of  political rivalries based on 
ethnic/regional divisions means that the ruling party is 
not under severe pressure to target policy benefits on 
areas where the opposition is gaining ground. But 
possible general defection to rival parties is likely to worry 
the ruling party in the absence of improved livelihoods 
for the poor rural majority, particularly when investment 
and growth are taking place in other, non-agricultural 
sectors. Where livelihoods are under threat, party loyalties 
are likely to loosen.34 
Delivering additional indirect benefits to rural areas 
and voters, through research and extension, for example, 
takes time and is less visible than direct transfers such 
as input subsidies. Though, as we will see, research and 
extension are earmarked for substantial additional 
funding, it is not self evident that more money will mean 
better performance.35 Alternatives to offering direct 
policy benefits to rural voters include the use of force 
and intimidation, bribery and vote-rigging during 
elections. These require the mobilisation of local political 
and administrative elites and are unlikely to be 
accompanied by significant direct benefits to the mass 
of rural voters beyond receipt of green and yellow (ruling 
party) kanga (wrappers) and kofia (caps) at election 
time.
Research question 2: How has aid influenced 
Tanzanian agricultural policy formulation and 
implementation?
Structural adjustment in the 1980s saw a rapid decline 
in donor support for agriculture, reflecting the failure of 
statist policies of the preceding two decades.36 More 
recently, international interest in food security and 
poverty reduction, global warming and biofuels has 
regenerated donor agency, philanthropy and private 
sector interest in tropical agriculture.  
Aid to Tanzanian agriculture is dominated by loans 
from the WB, followed by IFAD and the AfDB. New 
initiatives, including the Alliance for the Green Revolution 
in Africa (AGRA), bring additional private resources into 
the mix, supplementing loan-financed project and (still 
quite limited) sector support from bilateral sources.37 In 
addition, international NGOs also finance and implement 
projects of one kind or another in collaboration with 
local partner organisations. As a result, Tanzanian 
agriculture is the focus of multiple external initiatives 
with diverse rationales, objectives and implementation 
modalities. The literature suggests that neither the 
government nor the various external actors have the 
capacity to coordinate these different initiatives 
effectively.38
Last, external agents push policy prescriptions as well 
as direct interventions. Since the mid- 1980s, ‘state versus 
market’ discourses have been the focus of policy debate. 
There is a view, expressed by both external and local 
critics, that donors—the WB in particular—have imposed 
neo-liberal policies on aid dependent recipients like the 
GoT. An alternative view is that, in the final analysis, local 
policy preferences prevail.39 How has foreign aid 
influenced policies and policy implementation? How 
does foreign aid influence the main players’ patronage 
strategies?
This report examines agricultural policy through the 
lens of two GoT initiatives, the Agriculture Sector 
Development Programme (ASDP) and the National 
Agricultural Inputs Voucher Scheme (NAIVS). The ASDP 
was chosen as it constitutes the GoT’s major agricultural 
policy initiative of the new century. ASDP offers an 
opportunity to examine ways in which agricultural policy 
reflects and responds to the ruling elite’s concern with 
maintaining electoral support during a period of rising 
political competition. Did the ASDP offer farming 
households new public goods or market opportunities 
that might help the ruling party retain its traditional 
support among the rural electorate? Alternatively, did 
existing informal patronage networks dominate the 
policy implementation process in ways that might 
undermine this electoral calculus? The NAIVS is a 
potentially politically rewarding investment in targeted 
input subsidies (fertiliser and improved seeds) that went 
to scale two years before the 2010 elections. Both ASDP 
and NAIVS involved policy discussions and financial 
commitments on the part of multilateral and bilateral 
donors.  How did donor concerns with the GoT’s policy 
choices and implications for deepening agricultural 
markets affect the elaboration and implementation of 
these two initiatives?
We first turn to the ASDP.
3.0 The Agricultural 
Sector Development 
Programme
The ASDP (2006-13) was Tanzania’s main agricultural 
policy initiative of the new century. ASDP was billed as 
the ‘operationalisation’ of the Agricultural Sector 
Development Strategy (ASDS 2000). Preparing an 
agricultural strategy was a condition for Tanzania to 
receive HIPC debt relief (late 1990s) and for the subsequent 
PRSP (MKUKUTA). The ASDS proposed to: (i) strengthen 
the institutional framework for managing agricultural 
development; (ii) create a favourable climate for 
commercial activities, including improving the marketing 
of inputs and outputs; and (iii) improving transport and 
trade.40  The ASDP added processes of decentralisation 
and participation to this list.
External support for the ASDP was to be ‘basket 
funded’. From the late 1990s, GoT and donors developed 
basket funding arrangements for health and education, 
subsequently reducing the number of stand-alone 
projects in these sectors.  According to the Agricultural 
Reference Group (2004:1) ‘The large number of projects 
especially in the Agricultural Sector have distorted the 
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domestic decision (sic) process, undermined ownership, 
and decreased efficiency of resource allocation.’41 
Developing an agriculture basket to serve the same 
objective proved difficult due to major policy 
disagreements between the GoT and donors and the 
existence of no less than five agriculture sector lead 
ministries (ASLM).42
Donors viewed the initial ASDP draft as proof that the 
GoT still maintained an essentially statist view of the 
sector, with the government as the main service provider 
and the private sector playing a subordinate role. One 
donor described the programme as a ‘wish list’ based on 
the four Cs: Cars, Cash, Computers and Cellphones. 
Ministries were likened to a ‘hungry animal’. Donors were 
consequently reluctant to move towards basket funding 
the agricultural sector.43
The ASDP proposed achieving poverty alleviation 
through decentralisation, community participation in 
decision-making, and private sector leadership in 
production, marketing, processing and service delivery.44 
All three themes reflect largely externally-derived 
agendas, and have proved problematic, as explained 
below.45
The implementation of ASDP was extremely slow and 
there were many problems. Greeley (2008) suggests that 
‘the underlying problems with the ASDP process were 
... decentralisation, irrigation and harmonisation and 
alignment.’ 47  In a detailed analysis, Therkildsen (2011) 
shows how the GoT and donor agencies struggled to 
find enough common ground to proceed with the ASDP.48 
Despite GoT claims to privilege private sector leadership, 
to donors ASDP looked like a traditional government-
centred, productivity-enhancing programme with the 
private sector playing the role of contractor. 49   The central 
ministries resisted donor pressures to give LGAs a more 
independent role.50 
Additional problem areas identified by donors 
included a growing emphasis on fertiliser subsidies; state 
intervention in areas best left to the private sector; 
‘incremental administrative costs’ entailed in spreading 
public agricultural functions across five ministries; and 
the failure of the GoT to reflect ASDP priorities in the 
agricultural budget. On subsidies, donors argued that: 
‘The recent increase in fertiliser subsidies 
creates specific distortions in the fertiliser 
market, and also sends a wider signal that 
the Government may not confine itself 
to provision of public goods and services, 
as committed under the ASDP.’ 51
We return to fertiliser subsidies in section 4.
A 2004 trouble-shooting workshop for GoT and donor 
representatives to review progress in preparing ASDP 
implementation listed 48 ‘achievements’ and 111 
‘challenges’, including lack of commitment, ownership 
and leadership.52 How did implementation proceed, and 
who benefited? We now turn to small-scale irrigation 
schemes, the (eventual) main component of the ASDP.
A 1997 Agricultural Policy Paper mentioned a target 
of irrigating one million additional ha of land, and this 
figure was repeated in the 2001 ASDS and the 2005 CCM 
election manifesto.53 The original ASDP target for small-
scale irrigation was 405,000 ha of additional irrigated 
land within 15 years (or 27,000 ha a year). This figure was 
contained in the 2002 Irrigation Master Plan prepared 
by Japanese consultants. 54   In 2005, the GoT dramatically 
increased the ASDP budget target, from TShs 744 billion 
The formal objectives of ASDP (2006-13) are to (i) enable farmers to have better access to and use of agricultural 
knowledge, technologies, marketing systems and infrastructure, and (ii) increase private sector investment in 
agriculture based on an improved regulatory and policy environment. The ASDP has two components: (i) a local 
component which provides grants to LGs for community and farmer group investments in infrastructure (in 
particular irrigation) or productive activities, agricultural services (primarily agricultural extension), and capacity 
building and empowerment for farmer groups, local government and the private sector; and (ii) a national 
component, which finances agricultural research and extension service activities, development of irrigation 
policy and national level infrastructure, policy development and planning, capacity building for food security 
interventions, market development activities and programme coordination. 
The five Agricultural Sector Lead Ministries (ASLM) undertake ASDP activities, with MOWI responsible for the 
core irrigation component. The Programme is run by a Secretariat under the Department of Policy and Planning 
(DPP) in MAFC, with three advisory Task Forces consisting of GoT, donor, and non-state actor participants. District-
level activities are based on District Agricultural Development Plans (DADP) coordinated by PMO-RALG.
     ASDP is basket-funded. The total budget (on paper) is USD 1,930 million over a seven-year period. The lion’s 
share of ASDP money (70 percent) finances small-scale irrigation projects, formally selected on a competitive 
basis. A mere USD 8.8 million is earmarked for ‘Marketing and Private Sector Development’, suggesting that this 
is not an important GOT priority, but a donor ‘enclave’. ASDP is funded by the GoT (75 percent - mainly for irrigation), 
donors (13 percent - for non-irrigation activities) and farmers (12 percent).46 The WB (USD 165m) is the largest 
donor, followed by IFAD, ADB, and bilateral donors Japan and Ireland. 
Sources: World Bank 2006; Wolter 2008; Lewis 2008; Simbeye 2008
Box 1: ASDP in a nutshell
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to TShs 2,943 billion, and national and local irrigation 
activities were separated, with TShs 1,493 billion 
earmarked for districts and TShs 474 billion for national 
schemes.55 According to Greeley, these figures 
represented ‘a major shift in agricultural policy towards 
a huge public investment commitment.’56 What was 
behind such a dramatic change?
Jakaya Kikwete came to power at the end of 2005, 
winning an impressive 80 percent of the presidential 
vote.57  In a post-election meeting between Kikwete, 
Minister of Agriculture Joseph Mungai,58  and employees 
of the MAFC, Mungai proposed a total of five million ha 
of additional irrigation within a decade, or 500,000 ha a 
year, nearly twenty times the ASDP target and surreally 
unachievable. The President responded that a more 
realistic target would be a million ha over five years, still 
more than seven times the original ASDP target. Since 
(hardly surprisingly) no one challenged Kikwete’s 
proposal, which was contained in the 2005 manifesto, it 
was subsequently included in his inauguration speech, 
and became the main component of the programme.59 
Yet irrigation had not been a high-profile issue in the 
2005 manifesto. This story shows how easily the ‘intensive 
consultation with stakeholders’, including donors, 
farmers, and technocrats, that was said to characterise 
the ASDP process could be overridden by the political 
centre, with little room for negotiation.60  A CCM election 
commitment to one million ha of additional irrigation 
trumps a technocratic argument for a much less ambitious 
target based on practical considerations.
This story reminds us of the characteristic weaknesses 
of Tanzanian policy making discussed by Hyden for the 
early post-independence period, mentioned above, and 
alerts us perhaps to an important theme for a meta-
analysis of the political economy of agricultural policy 
in Africa.61
How did donors react to the new emphasis on 
irrigation? ASDP was initially crafted by mid-level 
ministerial staff and consultants during 2001-02. 
Thereafter (2003-06) donors of mixed experience came 
to dominate the process, leading to an overconcentration 
on procedural as opposed to substantive technical issues. 
Conflicts emerged between different donors and 
between donors and government over the respective 
roles of the line ministries and the ASDP secretariat, as 
mentioned above. The ministries did not want a strong 
secretariat that could interfere with their established 
procedures and routines. Donors were unhappy with the 
chosen coordinator, but failed in attempts to get him 
replaced by someone more influential and qualified.62
Therkildsen maintains that, prior to the President’s 
sudden intervention, no senior politician or bureaucrat 
was intimately involved in or identified with the ASDP. 
He offers the following possible broad explanations: elites 
only get involved in policy in crisis situations; they are 
not normally expected to play an active policy making 
role, but only to ‘interpret’ party policies; frequent 
shuffling of ministries, ministerial portfolios and 
permanent secretaries weakens policy making capacity 
at the top.63 OPM et al (2005) found that ministers were 
not generally involved in bargaining over budgetary 
allocations: such decisions are made by a relatively small 
group of ruling party politicians and officials around the 
president. Thus it is unlikely that the Minister of Agriculture 
played a very central role in either raising the agricultural 
budget during this time or raising the profile of small-
scale irrigation.64
The donors doubted that the government had the 
required capacity to implement such an ambitious 
programme, and in 2006 withdrew from financing ASDP’s 
(core) irrigation component.65 One may imagine the 
surprise, therefore, when the WB’s USD 90 million 
Agriculture Sector Development Project (ASDPr) was 
announced in 2008, making the WB the main external 
source of finance for both the national and the local 
irrigation initiatives.66  In addition, in 2009/10 and 2010/11 
the WB added a further USD 65 million to the original 
90, most of which went to finance small-scale irrigation 
under the DADPs.67 Additional finances were required 
as more and more proposals for new irrigation schemes 
were meeting DIDF funding criteria.68 Thus the WB 
bankrolled the very component of ASDP that donors 
had earlier refused to finance.69
Was there evidence that the GoT pressured the WB to 
support an initiative that its own experts had been critical 
of theretofore?  Were fertiliser lobbies involved?70   Was 
the WB happy to find a sizeable project to help meet its 
quite high disbursement targets?71 Perhaps a combination 
of these and other possible motives was involved.72
How successful was the implementation of irrigation 
projects under ASDP?73   Schram et al. (2007) identified 
numerous capacity constraints among all major 
stakeholders.
‘...farmers do not see the importance of 
contributing to the water fees’ so that ‘...
irrigators’ organisations often have 
problems with the collection of water 
fees.’ ‘Most WEOs ... lack adequate 
know-how to formulate irrigation 
projects.’ ‘The irrigation technicians that 
are available in the districts do not have 
the required skills for the implementation 
of the irrigation component of ASDP.’ ‘The 
Regional Agricultural Advisor is usually 
not an irrigation specialist...’ ‘The MAFC 
has not had a systematic and coordinated 
training programme for irrigation 
experts...’  ‘...there is limited knowledge of 
irrigation agronomy among services 
providers in the private sector.’ ‘Many 
local firms have limited experience in 
irrigation design and construction...’74
Annual joint reviews since 2008 demonstrate that ‘age 
old problems of irrigation are not being addressed...’75 
The third joint review (2008) found that economic analysis 
is absent for most proposed schemes. Local authorities 
prefer to invest in new schemes rather than rehabilitate 
existing ones. ‘Many projects are started but receive 
insufficient funds for completion.’ Further finances cannot 
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be planned or guaranteed as DIDFs have no legal status. 
‘This contributes to stop-go construction and the 
dragging out of project completion.’
The third joint review mission also noted ‘with concern 
that all schemes visited had unsustainable arrangements 
for ... operation and maintenance.’ Both skills to assess 
O&M needs and funds to finance them were inadequate. 
Beneficiary contributions towards O&M were 1/10th to 
1/20th of those in Asian countries or Kenya, too low 
‘to prevent inefficient water use and eventual scheme 
collapse.’ Problems exist with ensuring that water rights 
are respected and consistent with water availability. ‘A 
number of ... schemes produce only one crop per year and 
the land is idle for 7 months due to the unavailability of dry 
season water rights.’ Despite the grave problems noted by 
recent reviews, the 2009 review mission ‘established that 
the programme implementation is on track and overall 
performance rated to be satisfactory.’76
There is considerable evidence of corruption in local 
councils, which may undermine DADP implementation. 
For example, summarising spot checks of local road 
construction and maintenance in 2009, the parliamentary 
Local Authorities Accounts Committee (LAAC) 
Chairperson Dr Wilbrod Slaa77  identified sub-standard 
(or no) construction and ‘in most cases’ procurement and 
tender procedures were not followed ‘raising serious 
doubts of corruption.’ These weaknesses include ‘gaps 
in the accounting system, inadequate supervision and 
failure to observe laws and regulations.’ 78
The quality of project implementation is therefore a 
major concern, particularly in the less developed regions. 
For example, in 2009 a TShs 230 million irrigation scheme 
in Nyatwali village, Bunda District, Mara Region, failed 
to take off, allegedly because the pumps procured for 
the project were too small or ‘substandard’. The local DC 
twice refused to inaugurate the scheme, and ‘over 200 
hectares of maize are wilting for lack of water.’ The scheme 
is in the constituency of Mr Stephen Wassira, the (then) 
Minister of Agriculture. The Minister directed his private 
secretary “to follow up on the engines.”79 More recently, 
the Minister of Agriculture, ‘...accused heads of agricultural 
departments of misusing funds. “For example, when the 
government releases funds for irrigation projects, you 
use it (sic) to pay allowances to officers who participate 
in exhibitions. When we query, you come up with lengthy 
explanations why you decided to misappropriate the 
money,” he said.’80
Despite the serious constraints on project performance, 
the WB’s additional USD 35m finance for the ASDP 
committed in 2010 rated the risk that ‘Irrigation expansion 
targets [are] not aligned to capacity and available 
financing’ as ‘modest’, as were all other risk elements.81 
It is worth noting that almost as much of the additional 
finance was for rehabilitation (USD 15.4m) as for new 
projects (USD 16 million).  To state the obvious: projects 
that have to be ‘rehabilitated’ have clearly failed the 
sustainability test. How many past donor-financed 
irrigation schemes have delivered sustainable benefits 
to significant numbers of farmers, cost-effectively? 82  
The NIDF (large projects based on PPPs) has not taken 
off as government funds are inadequate and potential 
investors are not forthcoming because, it appears, of risks 
attached to water and land rights and failed out-grower 
arrangements. The problems of water rights and O&M 
identified at the start of ASDP had not been seriously 
addressed by 2010. The fifth joint review mission 
(September 2010) found that none of 12 schemes visited 
had O&M arrangements in place in line with ASDP 
guidelines. 83 Ten schemes had no user organisation. No 
farmers paid the required five percent of crop value as 
recommended. Yet the review makes no recommendations 
on how to tighten up O&M. 84  As in previous reviews, 
the overall progress of implementation is rated as 
‘satisfactory’. 85 Box 2 asks why so many audits, reviews 
and evaluations seem to paint an overly rosy picture of 
the performance of donor-financed projects and 
programmes.
Why are there so few project successes and so little 
impact? Therkildsen suspects that: 
‘donors and government collude in 
assessing the ASDP positively despite 
disturbing evidence from their own joint 
review reports to the contrary. One 
Tanzanian participant in the review told 
how the visited projects were cherry-
picked by the local authorities, and how 
there was a clear reluctance in the team 
to take hard decisions.’  86
ASDP claims that the total area under irrigation 
increased from 264,000 ha in 2006 to 332,000 in 2010, 
or 17,000 ha of additional irrigated area a year. 87  DADP 
procedures for identifying and financing irrigation 
projects were slow and cumbersome. The 2010 joint 
review claims that average paddy yields (most of the 
irrigation projects are for rice) increased by 600 percent 
as a result of irrigation. 88 Even if this claim is an 
exaggeration (and we cannot know for sure) we may still 
assume that project participants enjoy some short-term 
gains, but our analysis suggests that these gains (‘club 
goods?’) are unlikely to be either significant or 
sustained. 
There is no evidence to suggest that ASDP managers 
have addressed the fundamental issues of land and water 
rights, irrigation scheme O&M systems and finance that 
determine the sustainability of these investments. 89 After 
endorsing the irrigation focus of ASDP on coming to 
power, the President and his new ruling coalition left the 
tricky legal and institutional issues to the bureaucracy 
to sort out—or ignore. This division of labour between 
the political and the bureaucratic arms of the state has 
been noted by Hyden (1984, 2006). Donor concerns with 
GoT capacity to deliver proved well founded, though 
they did not prevent the WB from investing a total of 
USD 155 m in the programme. 89  
What were the politics behind ASDP? Theory suggests 
that the ruling coalition may have both clientelistic and 
electoral motives for spreading material benefits to rural 
areas. ASDP took off in a big way after the 2005 elections, 
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not before them, suggesting that the new president was 
not seeking immediate pay-offs of either kind. 91 If 
clientelism is the objective, the strategy may serve to 
keep local elites onside in order to get them to deliver 
the vote five years down the line. Assuming that 
clientelism is a partial motivation, the logic of allocating 
relatively large amounts of cash to LGAs is to allow the 
local elite to cream off some of the funds availed by the 
state and donors’ largesse. The struggle over who should 
ultimately control ASDP suggests that rents were a 
motivation, but this is not the only possible 
explanation.
At the same time, the political centre delegates 
responsibility for identifying irrigation scheme 
beneficiaries to local elites, who may also be expected 
to capture rents from construction contracts, which have 
an upper ceiling of USD 50,000.92 These elites include 
regional, district and lower-level political appointees, 
MPs, district council and ward officials, and local 
businessmen.93
Continued clientelism rather than seeking direct 
support from the electorate, is by far the dominant elite 
strategy. As Poulton concludes from a sample of African 
countries, ‘policy is rarely the dominant approach to 
gathering votes.’ 94 Patronage breeds leakages at all points 
in the project cycle, reducing the funds available for 
actual schemes.  The likelihood that many proposed 
schemes are not financed through lack of funds or other 
reasons raises the risk of disappointing more voters than 
are brought (or kept) on side through successful projects. 
Figure 1 summarises key characteristics of direct vote 
seeking as opposed to indirect clientelist strategies for 
elites intent on gaining political support.
The likelihood that clientelism will absorb the major 
part of available resources, leaving little to trickle down 
to the intended beneficiaries should not be discounted 
lightly. Systemic clientelism with periodic efforts by local 
elites to bring in the vote, in the general absence of 
economic progress or state-derived benefits of any kind, 
sums up our political economy of agricultural policy at 
the local level. Initiatives justified in terms of poverty 
Sources: Jansen 2009; Erickson 2011; World Bank 1990; 1998; Putterman1995;  Slaa 2009; Booth 2011
With some notable exceptions, programme/project monitoring, evaluation and audit, are heavily biased 
towards funders and implementers, with basic issues ignored or understated. For example, a forensic audit 
of a USD 50m  Norwegian funded programme implemented by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
(MNRP) concluded that at least half the programme funds had been misused, despite annual audits by the 
Controller and Auditor General, independently reviewed by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and regular joint 
missions, including project and site visits. One sub-project, previously considered a major success, turned 
out to be riddled with corruption and waste. Working relations built up over many years between external 
programme officials, researchers and consultants and their Tanzanian counterparts made it difficult to address 
fundamental issues about how the programme was managed, and touchy issues like possible waste and 
corruption at national and project level were studiously ignored. Neither side was in real terms accountable 
to a public watchdog or elected body. In a controversial resolution to the problem, the Tanzanian government 
paid back a fraction of the amount identified as misused by the forensic audit, while at the same time the 
Norwegian government was designing a NOK 500 million carbon credit progamme (REDD Plus) with the 
Tanzanian government.
     From 1966 to 1998, the WB financed 40 loans to Tanzanian agriculture and livestock. Of these, the WB 
evaluated 31 projects: 19 were rated ‘unsatisfactory’ (61 percent) and 12 ‘satisfactory’. Three agricultural 
adjustment credits worth USD 227 between 1990 and 1993 were deemed ‘satisfactory.’ A more recent internal 
assessment rated all ongoing WB projects in the country as ‘satisfactory’. Putterman (1995) explained the 
‘disappointing results of liberalization ... in agriculture’ (particularly in export crops) in terms of ‘deficiencies 
in policy and implementation.’ 
     The Parliamentary Local Authorities’ Accounts Committee (LAAC) routinely unearths examples of financial 
irregularities in LGAs receiving clean bills of health from the CAG. In part, this reflects the limitations of the 
audit function, which does not investigate value for money, but there is a strong suspicion that irregularities 
are systematically glossed over. ‘External’ and ‘independent’ reviews and evaluations are also routinely biased 
towards the funders and implementers who hire them. It is thus possible for an underperforming programme 
or project to be given an undeserved stamp of approval. Value for money (efficiency) and sustainability are 
chronic problems, rarely admitted. 
     Local academics and consultants generally avoid criticising the policies and projects on which they 
work. Patronage in hiring consultants and commissioning studies assures the bureaucracy that ‘sensitive’ or 
embarrassing issues will be ignored or dealt with sympathetically. Though there is somewhat less patronage 
in hiring external reviewers and consultants, most of these also exercise varying degrees of self-censorship 
in their handling of the same issues. Booth (2011) argues that self-censorship is exercised in part out of simple 
self-interest (school fees, mortgages...).  Without honest feedback on project performance it is impossible to 
learn from past failures, including ‘innovative’ projects trying new approaches. 
Box 2: What do we learn from audits, reviews and evaluations? 
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reducing or livelihoods enhancing objectives serve the 
purposes of networks of national and local elites. Are 
these ‘purposes’ on balance economically productive or 
largely redistributive? Rent theory leaves open the 
possibility that rents or rent-creating opportunities can 
be put to productive use, perhaps spurring the growth 
of a commercial faming class. In this respect, access to 
cheap or free land afforded to elite members by exercising 
political influence constitutes a key rent. Whether these 
rents are or are not used productively remains to be 
seen.
Bourgouin and Therkildsen (2011) argue that 
democratisation has increased the power of local elites 
relative to the political centre.95 Indicators of this trend 
include local control over land allocation, selection of 
CCM candidates, and the effects of decentralisation. 
Disputes over land allocation are common and increasing 
in light of growing population pressure and foreign 
investment in estate and outgrower agriculture, 
empowering village leaders. CCM candidates for 
parliament are now selected by all local party members, 
not just the local party elite. With the process of 
decentralisation delivering ever larger transfers to local 
governments, the political centre is under pressure to 
decentralise a significant amount of patronage to lower 
level actors.96
A further innovation that has potential to strengthen 
the position of incumbent parliamentarians is the 
Community Development Fund (CDF) that became law 
in August 2009. Both ruling and opposition MPs supported 
the bill, which was strongly opposed by CSOs.97 Currently, 
the CDF is worth TShs 10 billion (USD 6.3m) a year.98 
The apparent rising strategic powers of local elites 
vis-à-vis the centre are also a consequence of political 
competition: the centre now needs local elites more than 
it did before. Decentralisation may then be a way to 
compensate local elites for the extra political role that 
they now play as regards bringing in votes. Where 
opposition parties are relatively strong, there is potential 
for ‘real politics’ to develop around agricultural issues. 
Case studies are required to determine the circumstances 
in which real political competition is likely to improve 
rural livelihoods.
Since decentralisation policy originated with donors, 
one might speculate that—at least in this case—donor 
policies did have an impact on internal political 
processes.
Another key issue that data limitations prevent us from 
fully addressing is the extent to which specific regions/
districts are favoured in the ASDP or alternatively 
discriminated against for being in the opposition camp, 
as is sometimes claimed. At the district level, what 
determines which of the contending projects gets 
financed and which don’t? Are politically marginal 
regions/districts likely to receive more or less schemes 
than the more loyal?
Appendix 1 compares the country’s regional irrigation 
potential with transfers to regions for irrigation projects 
in 2007. It is clear that the transfers largely favour areas 
with relatively low irrigation potential: Ruvuma, Mtwara, 
Lindi, Tanga, and Singida; not the higher potential 
irrigation regions (Morogoro and Coast are the only high 
irrigation potential regions which also have high DADP 
allocations). Ruvuma is an outlier, receiving 12 percent 
of all funds. We lack an obvious explanation for this 
pattern (assuming it represents actual disbursements). 
It is most unlikely that it reflects variations in the quantity 
and quality of project proposals, which are aggregated 
at district level. According to Greeley (2008:21) the 
political centre still has the major say on the overall 
allocation of irrigation scheme finances. The high 
irrigation potential of Kilimanjaro Region (ranked 2nd in 
the country) is not reflected in the 2007 DADP allocations 
(ranked 19th). Could ‘Kilimanjaro’ be being ‘punished’ by 
the centre as a hotbed of the opposition rather than 
courted for its swing voters? Alternative explanations 
for the pattern of allocation include attempts to secure 
regional food security and/or poverty alleviation, as some 
of the favoured regions are relatively poor.100
Much comparative research suggests that Tanzania’s 
regulatory and policy environment is still fundamentally 
inconducive to private sector development. Our review 
of ASDP suggests that the private sector plays a subsidiary 
role and that the objective of increasing private 
investment in the sector is not furthered by the 
programme’s various components.101
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   to	   trickle	   down	   to	   the	   intended	   beneficiaries	   should	   not	   be	   discount d	   l ghtly.	   Systemic	  
clientelism	  with	   periodi 	   efforts	   by	   l cal	   elites	   to	   bring	   in	   the	   ote,	   in	   the	   ge eral	   absence	   of	  
economic	   p ogress	   or	   stat -­‐derived	   benefi s	   of	   any	   kind,	   sums	   up	   our	   political	   economy	   of	  
agricultural	   policy	   at	   th 	   local	   level.	   Initiatives	   justified	   in	   terms	   of	   poverty	   reducing	   or	  
livelihoods	  enhancing	  objectives	  serve	  the	  purposes	  of	  networks	  of	  national	  and	  local	  elites.	  Are	  
these	   ‘purposes’	   on	   balance	   economically	   productive	   or	   largely	   redistributive?	   Rent	   theory	  
leaves	   open	   the	   possibility	   that	   rents	   or	   rent-­‐creating	   opportunities	   can	   be	   put	   to	   productive	  
use,	  perhaps	  spurring	  the	  growth	  of	  a	  commercial	  faming	  class.	  In	  this	  respect,	  access	  to	  cheap	  
or	   free	   land	  afforded	   to	  elite	  members	  by	  exercising	  political	   influence	  constitutes	  a	  key	   rent.	  
Whether	  these	  rents	  are	  or	  are	  not	  used	  productively	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  
Bourgouin	  and	  Therkildsen	  (2011)	  argue	  that	  democratisation	  has	  increased	  the	  power	  
of	  local	  elites	  relative	  to	  the	  political	  centre.95	  	  Indicators	  of	  this	  trend	  include	  local	  control	  over	  
land	  allocation,	   selection	  of	  CCM	  candidates,	  and	   the	  effects	  of	  decentralisation.	  Disputes	  over	  
land	  allocation	  are	  common	  and	  increasing	  in	  light	  of	  growing	  population	  pressure	  and	  foreign	  
investment	   in	   estate	   and	   outgrower	   agriculture,	   empowering	   village	   leaders.	   CCM	   candidates	  
for	  parliament	  are	  now	  selected	  by	  all	   local	  party	  members,	  not	   just	  the	  local	  party	  elite.	  With	  
the	   process	   of	   decentralisation	   delivering	   ever	   larger	   transfers	   to	   local	   governments,	   the	  
political	   centre	   is	   under	   pressure	   to	   decentralise	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	   patronage	   to	   lower	  
level	  actors.96	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Allocating	  potential	   rent-­‐earning	  opportunities	   to	   lower	   levels	  of	   the	   ‘system’	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  
forms	  of	  patronage	  spending	  at	  the	  centre	  (see	  Cooksey	  and	  Kelsall	  2011	  and	  Cooksey	  2011a).	  
94	  Poulton	  2011:4.	  
95	  Bourgouin,	  Therkildsen	  and	  Geelan	  2011:8.	  Perhaps	  ‘influence’	  would	  be	  a	  more	  appropriate	  term.	  
96	  This	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  basic	  principal-­‐agent	  problem	  where	  the	  supervisory/sanctioning	  role	  of	  the	  
principal	   (central	   government)	  breaks	  down.	  The	   centre	   simply	  does	  not	  have	   the	   resources,	   including	  
information,	  to	  hold	  the	  periphery	  to	  account.	  	  
Figure 1:  Vote seeking and clientelistic elite strategies compared
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3.1 Conclusions on ASDP
3.1.1  State engagement with 
stakeholders
What does the irrigation component of ASDP tell us 
about agricultural policy? In its formulation and 
implementation does it reflect a programmatic 
engagement of policy makers and technicians with 
farmers to find sustainable solutions to water 
management problems? Or does it reflect the interests 
of senior politicians and bureaucrats to advance their 
own interests, both formal and informal? Or a bit of both? 
Where does ‘the market’ fit in?
One of the ASDP’s objectives is ‘to increase private 
sector investment in agriculture based on an improved 
regulatory and policy environment.’ GoT and donors have 
been the key actors throughout the ASDP project cycle. 
Commentators argue that the private sector (businesses 
and farmers) has not been sufficiently engaged in the 
programme. Did the private sector play a significant role 
in ASDP formulation and implementation? According to 
Lewis et al. (2008): ‘the private sector is not yet an active 
player in ASDP.’ On ASDP formulation and implementation, 
Lewis et al. relate that:
‘As early as 2002 - during ASDP 
preparation -  there was a high level meeting 
of private sector stakeholders jointly 
chaired by the then Permanent Secretaries 
of the Ministries of Agriculture and Food 
Security and Cooperatives and Marketing. 
This ‘brainstorming’ session produced 
recommendations from key private sector 
organisations covering aspects of 
investment, marketing, institutional 
development and land development which 
might be addressed through ASDP. 
However, substantial support for private 
sector development has not yet been 
systematically incorporated into ASDP 
activities.’102
‘Joint Implementation Reviews of ASDP 
indicate that ... there has so far been limited 
involvement of farmers and other private 
sector actors in the process. It is generally 
acknowledged that “capacity building and 
a change of attitude in LGAs are needed to 
make farmer empowerment and private 
sector involvement a reality”.’103
Were irrigation schemes built and rehabilitated 
efficiently and effectively? Programme reviews cite 
fundamental problems that undermine impact and 
sustainability. Above we quoted Hyden’s critique of the 
post-independence policy process in Tanzania. Policy 
making was overly ambitious and failed to take human 
and material constraints into account.104 Does the 
decision to focus on irrigation conform to this image of 
unrealistic policy making?  Arguably, the sudden 
presidential initiative and ASDP’s subsequent focus on 
small-scale irrigation provides a modern example of 
impromptu ‘policy-making’, largely uninformed by prior 
technical and risk analysis.  Irrigation engineers were 
sceptical of the exercise, but were reluctant to say so 
publicly.  This conclusion supports the ‘policy failure’ 
explanation of agricultural underdevelopment 
mentioned in section 1, but it does not address the issue 
of the interests served by irrigation schemes. 
Although farmers and their representatives were 
involved in the formulation of irrigation projects at the 
local level, the ultimate choice of the ‘most viable’ projects 
was left to the secretariat representing the ASLMs. We 
have no information on the fairness or technical quality 
of the screening process, or the degree to which 
patronage is involved. Partial indirect evidence cited 
above suggests that the pattern of DADP financing is 
unrelated to irrigation potential, but more research is 
required.
No doubt some schemes were more viable than others, 
but the chances that many of them (rehabilitated and 
new) will prove sustainable or economically viable are 
not good, if past experience of routine policy 
implementation failure is any guide. A parallel is rural 
domestic water schemes, which have frequently suffered 
from management and governance problems that 
threatened their sustainability.105 
We cannot say that the main motivation behind the 
irrigation schemes was to provide public goods benefiting 
farm households and communities; they seem rather to 
serve the institutional imperatives of (part of ) the ruling 
elite and the donor community, discussed further 
below.106 We can speculate that success in providing 
patronage benefits to local elites may have helped 
motivate the latter to support the ruling elite as well as 
to bring out the rural vote at election time. It is also 
possible that some intended beneficiaries derived 
significant value from irrigation schemes, including 
higher yields and income, which might encourage them 
to vote for the ruling party. We lack hard evidence to test 
either proposition.
3.1.2    Role of donors
Donors fund the ASDP through basket funding, 
general budget support, and projects. From the outset, 
donors had difficulty coordinating their aid efforts and 
operationalising their formal commitment to enhancing 
the role of the private sector. They found it difficult to 
agree with the GoT on key aspects of the ASDP, but they 
also disagreed among themselves. According to 
Greeley: 
‘... donor proliferation, with seven 
DPs helping to develop the ASDP, has 
been a serious obstacle to speedy ... 
progress.  There is (sometimes) lack of 
internal coherence of DPs within 
country offices and often with their 
HQs’.107
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 These problems slowed down the launch and 
implementation of ASDP.
The GoT’s administration of the agricultural sector—
with five ‘agricultural’ ministries—makes it extremely 
difficult to implement sector-wide projects and 
programmes effectively, efficiently and on time. The 
practical solution adopted by the WB and other lending 
agencies has been to ‘subcontract’ project implementation 
to notionally independent Project Management Units 
(PMUs).108  This solution offers significant opportunities 
for patronage in project staff recruitment, rent-seeking 
in tendering and contracting, and the embezzlement 
and waste of project funds.109
In her discussion of aid to Tanzanian agriculture, Wolter 
(2008) notes that ‘the evidence so far suggests that the 
involvement of recipient, and especially the private 
sector, in the development and implementation of 
DADPs is limited.’ She cites evidence suggesting that 
‘donors were … reluctant to share the lessons they had 
learnt from their projects. … As a result the chance to 
feed project experience into programme support was 
largely missed.’ Furthermore, ‘The 2007 World Bank 
evaluation of several of its projects in the agricultural 
sector points to the Bank’s limited analysis beforehand 
of the institutional capacity of the GoT to implement the 
ASDP.’110
Analysts have long linked aid ineffectiveness to 
institutional weaknesses and rent-seeking. Ateba (1999) 
argues that failure to take these into account can explain 
much of the WB’s poor project performance in Africa.111 
During the 2008 parliamentary budget session, the 
chairman of the Parliamentary Finance Committee, Dr 
Abdallah Kigoda, said that ‘the funds channeled to local 
authorities through the ASDP must be strictly monitored 
to curb embezzlement as the impact of the billions spent 
in the past was not evident.’112 
ASDP was a first attempt at an agricultural basket 
arrangement following the successful introduction of 
education and health baskets. Inadequate oversight and 
accountability among both donors and government 
allow this collaboration to continue, despite failure to 
deliver economically viable and sustainable outcomes 
to significant numbers of farm households. Therkildsen 
identifies a virtual conspiracy between aid agencies and 
the GoT that drives a common discourse of project 
success despite broad agreement on the low level of 
state capacity regarding public goods creation and 
service delivery.113  As long as both sides of the aid 
equation are largely unaccountable to local or external 
publics, underperformance and waste of human and 
material resources in aid-financed projects are likely to 
continue.  A political economy of aid needs to address 
the question: why, if project loans are so conceptually 
and practically flawed, does the project cycle continue 
to survive and prosper? 
As bilateral donors either pulled out or retained a 
modest presence in ASDP, WB funding became far more 
than all other donor contributions combined.  The WB’s 
decision to proceed with a large loan in support of ASDP 
despite serious policy and practical reservations among 
numerous other donors served to underwrite the vested 
interests of state actors in the programme, thus 
undermining the attempt to leverage a more market-
oriented  approach through basket funding and budget 
support. The WB’s dominant role among Tanzania’s 
traditional donors allowed this to happen without the 
obvious contradictions becoming a public embarrassment 
for the Bank. The virtual conspiracy between WB and 
GOT includes claims that the WB’s support was validated 
by the results, despite the major caveats mentioned 
above.114
We now turn to input subsidies. Are these a more 
successful vote buying ploy than irrigation schemes?
4.0 The National 
Agricultural Input 
Voucher Scheme
In his 2003 budget speech, the Minister of Agriculture 
and Food Security announced the reintroduction of 
fertiliser subsidies. Neither the subsidies nor their 
concentration on the Southern Highlands had been the 
object of prior public debate.115  Moreover, ‘subsidies 
went against the stated policy of all major donors.’116 
Continued donor opposition to subsidies contrasted with 
pressures from MAFS and MPs to spread the subsidies 
beyond the Southern Highlands117
Subsidies were  worth TShs 2 billion in 2003/04, 
increasing to TShs 32 billion in 2008/09 and, with the 
help of a WB loan, TShs 138 billion (USD 92 million) in 
2009/10, when the system expanded to include paddy. 
In 2008/09 the National Agricultural Input Voucher 
Scheme (NAIVS) targeted 700,000 farmers in ten regions118 
to receive 155,000 metric tons of subsidised fertiliser and 
65,000 tons of seeds.119 Nearly 1.5 million farmers were 
targeted in 2009/10. In 2010/11, an election year, NAIVS 
was scaled up to 74 districts in 20 regions targeting 
2,000,000 direct beneficiaries.120 Therkildsen (2011) sees 
this escalation of subsidies as evidence of the ruling 
coalition’s efforts ‘to win political power.’ The decision to 
reintroduce and expand fertiliser subsidies was politically 
motivated and seen as a vote winner by the highest 
political leadership.121 It was also very much against the 
advice of the donor community at the time, as explained 
in table 1.
Imported fertiliser is used mainly on maize, tobacco, 
and coffee. Fertiliser use varies hugely between regions. 
The Southern Highlands ‘big four’ regions (Iringa, Mbeya, 
Rukwa and Ruvuma) consumed more than half of all 
fertiliser in Tanzania prior to the removal of subsidies. As 
part of structural adjustment, the IFIs advised the GoT 
to remove fertiliser subsidies and abandon pan-territorial 
pricing of inputs and purchased crops. The demise of 
these policies (1991-94) made commercial maize 
production too expensive for many smallholders, 
particularly in outlying parts of the Southern Highlands.122 
In 1991, over a quarter (27 percent) of agricultural 
holdings are said to have used fertiliser, declining to only 
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11 percent in 1997.123 However, the withdrawal of 
subsidies seems to have had little effect on maize 
production per capita,124  which has remained flat, while 
labour productivity has stagnated at a very low level.125 
Table 1 summarises input use in ten mainland regions 
in a survey undertaken during March-April 2007.126
The majority of Tanzanian farmers have never used 
chemical fertiliser, improved seeds or other chemical 
inputs. Few have used agro-chemical pesticides, 
herbicides or fungicides. Even two-thirds of the best-off 
farmers have never used chemical fertiliser.127 
Disaggregating the results reveals marked regional 
differences, with nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of 
Iringa respondents having used chemical fertilisers (see 
below).128 
Not surprisingly, the least poor farmers were much 
more likely than the poor to use chemical fertiliser and 
improved seed, and to find input prices and availability 
more satisfactory than the poor. We suspect that a 
relatively small group of better-off farmers accesses the 
lion’s share of the fertiliser available to Tanzanian farmers, 
though evidence-based quantifications of this are not 
yet available. Below, we make a first attempt.
A review of fertiliser subsidies and use in Iringa, 
the country’s main maize surplus region, reveals the 
following.129 First, Iringa farmers received nearly a fifth 
(19.5 percent) of all subsidised fertiliser during 2009, and 
the four southern highlands regions nearly half (49.3 
percent).130   Second, more Iringa farmers use chemical 
fertiliser than farmers in other regions. In 2007, only 
37 percent of Iringa farmers had never used chemical 
fertiliser, compared with 86 percent of farmers nationwide 
(see Appendix 2).131 Third, there was a wider range of 
fertiliser use between poorer and better-off farmers in 
Iringa than nationally, suggesting a group of larger than 
average farmers in Iringa who benefit disproportionately 
from subsidised inputs.132 Four, inorganic fertiliser use 
varies significantly between districts. Table 2 gives 
2002/03 census figures for fertiliser use in Iringa’s seven 
districts.113
In Njombe in 2002/03, 41 percent of the total planted 
area consists of farms using ‘mostly’ inorganic fertiliser, 
compared to only 25 percent for the Region as a whole. 
Table 2: Fertiliser use in Iringa Region by District, 2002-2003
No fertiliser Inorganic fertiliser Manure/compost Total
Households % Households % Households % Households %
Iringa R 28,351 54 11,520 22 12,842 24 52,713 100
Mufindi 31,180 56 8,962 16 16,625 28 56,767 100
Njombe 21,849 28 32,625 41 24,297 31 78,771 100
Ludewa 16,705 68 4,421 18 3,402 14 24,528 100
Makete 12,401 49 5,420 21 7,406 30 25,227 100
Iringa U 569 49 398 34 195 17 1,162 100
Kilolo 26,220 66 6,236 16 7,093 18 39,549 100
Total 137,276 49 69,582 25 71,859 26 278,717 100
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2007:154
Table 1: Use of chemical fertiliser, agro-chemicals and improved seeds in 2006, percent
Last year, did you use more or less of the following?
Chemical fertiliser Poorest Middle Least poor All
About the same 1 4 10 5
Less 1 5 12 6
Never used 98 90 69 86
Agro-chemicals Poorest Middle Least poor All
More 2 5 9 3
About the same 6 12 19 12
Less 8 11 12 10
Never used 84 72 60 72
Improved seeds Poorest Middle Least poor All
More 3 6 11 7
About the same 3 9 14 9
Less 4 8 9 7
Never used 89 76 66 77
REPOA 2007 (n=2,837)
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Appendix 3 suggests that Njombe received a 
disproportionate number of the total vouchers allocated 
to the region. Very provisionally, we may conclude that: 
the southern highlands (plus Morogoro) are the main 
targets for subsidies; better-off farmers benefit 
disproportionately from input subsidies; the better-off 
farmers are concentrated in certain areas, for example, 
Njombe; and such areas are likely to receive more 
vouchers per farming household.
Iringa rural constituencies are a bastion of support for 
the ruling party. In the 2010 elections, the Chadema 
candidate narrowly won the Iringa Urban constituency 
(50.4 of votes cast versus134 44.3 for CCM), but the other 
nine Iringa constituencies remained firmly in CCM hands. 
In Njombe Urban, Ismani, Ludewa, and Mufindi (North) 
constituencies, CCM candidates were returned 
unopposed,  while in the other four the CCM majority 
ranged from 91 percent (Kilolo) to 67 percent (Njombe 
West).135  
The above description of input subsidies is consistent 
with a number of interpretations of what drives Tanzanian 
agricultural policy. There is little doubt that the ruling 
elite would be interested in the formulation and 
implementation of the NAIVS.  First, if subsidies lead to 
a rise in maize production this would put a downward 
pressure on prices in Dar es Salaam and other urban 
markets.136 Since food is the main expenditure item of 
the urban poor, it makes political sense to subsidise maize 
prices. Input subsidies are also consistent with a vote-
seeking or a supporter-rewarding interpretation of policy. 
Alternatively, the solid support for CCM in rural areas 
could be seen as a response to the input subsidies, 
suggesting that votes can be bought by successful 
policies. The weakness of this argument is that many 
farmers probably do not receive subsidised inputs, even 
in Iringa. There is also a risk that the disappointed 
non-recipients are more likely to vote for the opposition 
than perhaps they would have been in the absence of 
subsidies. The evidence presented below concerning the 
implementation of the input scheme leaves little doubt 
that misallocations from national level down undermined 
the objective of targeting the subsidies on a broad group 
of smallholder households. But what orders of magnitude 
are we talking about?   
Control of subsidies also means control of incentives 
for patronage and rent-seeking. At the national level, 
rents may be very substantial. Locally, we may expect 
subsidised inputs to provide benefits for ‘lower level 
factions’ within the ruling party and bureaucracy, and 
for big farmers.137 These will then be more motivated to 
support the centre and bring out the vote when required 
to do so.138 Clearly, the greater the benefits to lower level 
factions of CCM and other supporters through diversions 
of the subsidy, the fewer the benefits to farmers in 
general.
Further research is required to understand the local-
national political dynamic and the role of larger commercial 
farmers in input policy and implementation.
How did donors react to the growing policy interest 
in subsidised inputs? In 2004, donors expressed their 
concerns in a letter to the Minister of Finance.139 The 
main issues were that the profitability of fertiliser use 
varies widely; subsidies are difficult to target, and 
benefits are modest even for the recipients; they are 
expensive to administer; crowd out the private sector; 
and displace more sustainable land use practices. As 
regards targeting, ‘benefits are often captured by the 
least needy farmers.’140 Administrative costs (including 
rent-seeking) ‘often outweigh the benefits.’ Subsidised 
fertiliser often arrives too late to be effective, and has 
often been of the wrong type.141  The DPs collectively 
concluded ‘that money currently allocated to price 
and credit subsidies for fertiliser can be better spent 
on alternative approaches, many of which are already 
operative in Tanzania and can be scaled up.’142
The general donor attitude to fertiliser subsidies 
softened in the mid-2000s, in part as a result of the 
perceived success of the Malawi subsidy programme.143 
Thus it was somewhat less of a surprise than might have 
been the case when in 2008 the WB announced a USD 
160m loan for an Accelerated Food Security Project 
(AFSP), in support of the input voucher scheme. Still, WB 
staff were warned of the likely risks involved in a large-
scale project of this kind in Tanzania. They were reminded 
that input vouchers were ‘enormously risky’ because of 
the lack of critical background analysis and the inadequacy 
of state technical and managerial capacity at both 
national and local levels.144  The WB justified the project 
as an emergency response to an urgent request from 
the GoT to address a short-term food crisis.145
A food ‘crisis’ can denote localised shortages as a result 
of crop failure leading to hunger in rural households, or 
urban shortages leading to price rises for the majority 
poor. Both aspects were potentially important for the 
ruling elite in the build up to the 2010 national elections. 
Subsidies targeted the southern highlands, Iringa Region 
in particular.  This strongly suggests a concern with urban 
food prices. In terms of farmer targeting, those with one 
hectare or more of maize or rice were formally identified 
as potential beneficiaries. Those below this threshold 
were excluded on the grounds that they would not be 
able to afford even subsidised fertiliser.146 A relatively 
small number of better-off farmers were formally 
excluded on the grounds that they could afford to pay 
the full price.
In 2008, there were said to be just over four million 
farming households in Tanzania, of whom ‘farming 
households growing  more than 1 ha of maize or rice’ 
numbered 2.9 million (73 percent of the total).147 The 
total number of farmers (as opposed to farming 
households) growing more than one ha of maize or rice 
was put at 2.59 million. Of this number, almost all (2.55 
million) were identified by Village Voucher Committees 
(VVC) as potential ‘beneficiaries’.148 MAFS distribution 
data indicate that 29 percent of this total received maize 
fertiliser subsidies in 2008/09, and 57 percent in 2009/10. 
Given that in 2007 86 percent of farmers had never used 
chemical fertilisers (Table 1 above), the input scheme 
aimed to reach an additional 29 percent of all farm 
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households nationwide (86 percent minus 57 percent), 
or roughly 750,000 farmers ‘growing more than 1 ha of 
maize or rice.’ If each household contained two voters, 
CCM’s target constituency to help retain electoral support 
could be 1.5 million voters. However, the actual 
distribution of vouchers is likely to have reduced this 
figure significantly, for reasons discussed below.
Input vouchers are distributed through a series of 
committees from the national to the village level.149  The 
MAFC manages and oversees the entire process, 
establishes the volume of vouchers to be distributed ‘in 
line with regional requirements’, prepares guidelines for 
the scheme’s implementation and a directive on farmers’ 
eligibility. MAFC also prepares guidelines for setting up 
voucher supervisory committees at regional, district, 
ward and village levels. The Minister of Agriculture chairs 
the MAFC committee and the PS is the secretary.150 The 
regional committee, which is chaired by the RC, manages 
the scheme at the regional level and is charged to assure 
that areas whose irrigation infrastructure is in good 
condition are given priority in voucher distribution.  The 
district committee, chaired by the DC, is responsible for 
identifying rice and maize farmers eligible for the scheme. 
Here we see the overlap between ASDP and NAIVS. The 
Ward committee, chaired by the WEO, is the link between 
the village and the district. Finally, the village committee 
prepares a list of farmers engaged in growing at least 
one hectare of maize or rice and identify those who 
qualify as beneficiaries for the voucher scheme. There 
are three vouchers, two for fertiliser and one for seeds. 
Agents provide inputs to farmers in exchange for 
vouchers and cash. The vouchers represent half the retail 
value of the inputs. Vouchers are checked by the DALO 
before the agents present them to the National 
Microfinance Bank (NMB) for payment.  
Thus identifying beneficiaries of subsidies is micro-
managed by the state’s politico-administrative system, 
with the private sector brought in to handle the finances 
and physical distribution.151 The latest (2010) review rated 
most NAIVS/AFSP performance indicators as ‘moderately 
satisfactory’.152
‘The implementation of the voucher 
program shows substantial regional and 
local variation. Critical data to facilitate 
decision making on voucher allocation 
and program implementation for the 
current year still has significant gaps. 
The implementation of seed sector 
activities continues to be seriously 
delayed, including as a result of slow 
procurement.’ ‘...the mission noted poor 
documentation and recording of the 
voucher distribution at both district and 
village level.’
In terms of financial management the review noted 
weak internal controls and poor record keeping, delays 
in voucher redemption and in the release of government 
counterpart funds. Consequently, the:
‘Financial Management System risk 
has been rated as substantial due to the 
complexity of the project which involves 
different actors with high inherent 
fiduciary risk taking into consideration 
that the vouchers are as good as 
cash.’153
Half a dozen actions agreed to in a previous action 
plan to improve financial management had not been 
implemented by the time of the 2010 review.
Despite these weaknesses, no grand corruption or 
‘elite capture’ was detected in NAIVS/AFSP. In Iringa:
‘At a meeting of District level officials 
of the entire Region those present were 
encouraged to share such instances but 
examples were not forthcoming. The 
only examples of maladministration 
related to capture by a particular agro 
dealer of all the vouchers thereby 
curtailing competition, attempt by an 
agro dealer to cheat farmers by giving 
less quantity of input that (sic) required, 
attempt by the village level officials to 
dominate the allocation of vouchers etc. 
However in all cases the maladministration 
was reported to have been detected in 
time and rectified. The mission found no 
reason to doubt this impression created 
by local authorities. It found the District 
Commissioner Iringa very involved in the 
project and taking a personal interest in 
its implementation by touring villages 
and educating farmers.’155
An official audit of the AFSP for 2009-10 gave the 
project an ‘unqualified’ opinion, observing that: ‘...
expenditure incurred was made judiciously and 
exclusively for the purpose of the Project with due 
attention to economy and efficiency.’156
Independent information on the implementation and 
impact of the AFSP is patchy, but a picture of systematic 
‘leakages’ is emerging that challenges the official view 
presented above.157  At the national level, fertiliser agents 
have been registered under pressure from senior officials. 
In August 2009, training of agents by external consultants 
was interrupted when the MAFC came up with a different 
list of agents, who were duly trained, though some lacked 
the basic experience for the task.158 ‘Fake’ agro-dealers 
may reallocate vouchers destined for remote areas to 
other beneficiaries. Asked in April 2008 whether the 
MOAF was ‘aware that some of the selected agents are 
cheating by ... exporting subsidised fertiliser to 
neighbouring countries or even selling the same to 
farmers at full market prices’ the Minister of Agriculture 
replied that: ‘the ministry is ... investigating these 
allegations.’159 
At the local level, abuses of input distribution 
procedures are common. A civil society160 source claimed 
that: ‘The operation of the input subsidy ... has been 
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dominated by corruption.’161 The CAG’s annual reports 
note numerous irregularities in the management of the 
voucher scheme.162 In January 2008, two junior officials 
in Mbozi District were ‘suspended  ... for illegally selling 
... tonnes of subsidised fertiliser’ to Malawi and Zambia. 
In June 2010, Rukwa Regional Commissioner Daniel Ole 
Njoolay tasked the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and Attorney General’s office 
(AG) to carry out investigations into ‘massive irregularities, 
misappropriation of funds and theft of agriculture inputs 
worth over 8bn/- through the voucher system.’163 In 
August 2011, two voucher distribution agents in Rufiji 
District were arraigned for offering a TShs 10 million bribe 
to a PCCB officer in connection with an investigation into 
input voucher fraud in the district.164  At the same time, 
an Area Councillor in Moshi Rural District complained 
that she had “been swamped with complaints regarding 
the distribution of subsidised fertilise.”165 In Chato District, 
Kagera Region, no less than 49 people, including three 
agriculture and livestock officers, 29 village executive 
officers and 11 village chairpersons) were charged in 
court for abusing the system. This source points out that 
‘all the accused are respectable community leaders and 
government officials who … are tasked to implement 
and safeguard the system.’166  
Only farmers who can afford the fertiliser at the 
subsidised rate are supposed to be deemed eligible by 
the village committee, headed by the Village Executive 
Officer, but in some villages all farmers are deemed 
eligible.167 Some farmers are said to sign for vouchers 
they do not receive in exchange for a small cash 
payment.168 In September 2009, the Mbeya District 
Commissioner complained that ‘dishonest agents ... 
collude with unscrupulous businesspeople who buy the 
fertiliser and sell it to farmers at a higher price.’169 One 
MP is cited as saying that “the subsidised fertiliser was 
bought by traders and resold to farmers at a profit.” 
Another MP claimed that “poor farmers don’t benefit.”170 
In a study of the voucher pilot programme in Kilimanjaro 
Region, Pan and Christiaensen (2011) found that elected 
village officials ‘received about 60 percent of the 
distributed vouchers, a factor that significantly reduced 
the targeting performance of the program, especially in 
more unequal and remote communities.’171 Ongoing 
research in Manyara Region found that in a small and 
unrepresentative sample of input voucher recipients, 22 
out of 26 vouchers (85 percent) were captured by the 
best-off quartile.172  Finally, in August 2011, President 
Kikwete complained that some officials were ‘sabotaging 
the delivery and distribution of farm inputs’ while ‘others 
were forging farmers’ signatures to show that they have 
received subsidised … fertiliser…’173 
The possible abuse of the input system is corroborated 
by oversight exercises by the Controller and Auditor 
General (CAG) and the Parliamentary Accounts Committee 
(PAC). In April 2011, PAC Chairman John Cheyo criticised 
the Ministry of Agriculture over the management of the 
inputs and the power tillers (small tractors) programmes. 
‘The committee says there are all tale-tale signs of 
existence (sic) of massive corruption and flouting of rules 
and regulations governing good business practice in the 
ministry...’, citing the qualified reports MAFS received from 
the Controller and Auditor General for the last two 
financial years.174 One of the CAG reports referred to states 
that the:
‘Ministry ordered 2,687,600 farmer’s 
input vouchers with face value of Shs. 
87,684,600,000 at a cost of Shs.646,552,040 
out of which vouchers with face value 
Shs. 18,633,000,000 costing Shs. 
135,010,669 were not distributed.’175
Officially, ‘The segment of the voucher supply chain 
most vulnerable to manipulation and corruption is at 
the village level.’176 We may doubt this, but the above 
narrative seems to suggest a concerted attempt by higher 
levels of the administration to curb abuses of the inputs 
distribution system at lower levels that might serve to 
reduce the number of beneficiaries and increase the 
frustrations of those left out. This in turn suggests an 
important conclusion: the chain of command, with its 
multiple principal-agent linkages from national to village 
level, lacks the enforcement capability required to realise 
the vote-attracting intentions of the political apex. The 
president complains, but who will take offenders to 
task?177 This suggests the limits of voter-oriented elite 
initiatives in a political structure characterised by the 
rationale of decentralised patronage and informality.
The evidence cited above suggests that subsidised 
fertiliser is being systematically diverted from the poorer 
to the better off target groups. Evidence from REPOA 
(2007) suggests that benefits from the state accrue 
disproportionately to better-off farmers (Table 3).178 
Table 3: Government help to farmers, percent  2007
‘What does the government do to help farmers?’179 Poor Less-poor Least-poor All
Nothing 82 76 66 75
Subsidises fertiliser 1 5 15 7
Supplies improved seeds 4 6 6 5
Markets 2 4 3 3
Other 4 5 3 4
DK/No response 7 4 5 6
All 100 100 99 100
Source: REPOA 2007:17
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Although three-quarters of all farmers thought they 
received ‘nothing’ from the government by way of 
agricultural services, over a quarter of the least poor saw 
some benefits, subsidised fertiliser in particular.180 The 
emerging picture is of benefits formally intended for a 
broad swath of rural voters being systematically diverted 
to the better-off. If the latter were likely to vote for the 
ruling party anyway, there is little to be gained electorally 
from input subsidies. For the moment, no data are 
available on the actual distribution of vouchers or the 
extent to which the system is being manipulated. Further 
research is required on the distribution of subsidised 
inputs from the national down to the local level.181
A final point: the majority view is that from the late 
1970s, agricultural policy had a deleterious effect on rural 
livelihoods, but the party of ujamaa was not rejected en 
masse by rural voters as a result.182  It is possible that the 
ruling elite’s greater commitment to agriculture and the 
rapid expansion of subsidies in the build-up to the 2010 
elections had a positive impact on rural voters, 
independent of any benefits derived. Again, it is difficult 
to test this empirically.
4.1 Conclusions on NAIVS
The immediate objective of fertiliser subsidies was to 
help assure food self-sufficiency during a period of rising 
global food and fertiliser prices.183 But food self-sufficiency 
has been an agricultural policy objective since 
independence, and there are other ways than state-
managed projects of achieving the same objective. Below 
we return to our two research questions.
4.1.1   Vote-seeking versus clientelism
Our first research question asked whether the 
reintroduction of fertiliser subsidies could be interpreted 
as vote- or rent-seeking, or both. Policymakers may be 
motivated by a mix of both vote-seeking and rent-
seeking goals. Senior politicians were clear that 
subsidising inputs, which accounted for half the MAFC 
budget in 2010/11, had a vote-seeking dimension. It is 
clear that a much larger number of voters may benefit 
from relatively cheap farm inputs than from irrigation 
schemes. At the same time, a voucher scheme is much 
more vulnerable to clientelism at both national and local 
levels than a small-scale irrigation programme.184 Direct 
vote-seeking incentives are limited by the reach of the 
voucher scheme. In the 2009/10 season vouchers were 
said to have been distributed to 1.5 million households.185 
Clientelism reduces the number of rural voters benefiting 
from input vouchers. In an election year (2010) input 
vouchers were a means of mobilising both local elites 
and voters. Allowing local agricultural elites to capture 
rents from subsidies serves to keep them on side, and 
enlists their support in bringing in the vote. Evidence 
cited below suggests that this strategy is remarkably 
successful at lower levels of the electoral system.186  
As in the ASDP, the local ‘private sector’ was not a prime 
mover in the NAIVS but was incorporated into the scheme 
on the GoT’s terms as contracted financial and distribution 
managers. The only local source of fertiliser for the 
voucher scheme is the Minjingu phosphates factory in 
Manyara Region. The quality and appropriateness of the 
phosphates produced have been criticised by some 
farmers. Despite official support, the privately owned 
factory was obliged to sell through the Tanzania Fertiliser 
Company (TFC), an arrangement that threatened to 
bankrupt the plant.187 In this case, the inefficient 
incorporation of the private sector into the input subsidies 
programme served to lessen its impact.  A more strategic 
inputs policy would be to support the development of 
an efficient private inputs distribution system, but this 
is not an obvious short-term vote winner, and would 
require creating rent-making opportunities for a 
substantial number of small and medium-sized private 
companies, while removing such opportunities from 
existing beneficiaries/clients.
4.1.2 Role of donors
The role of the WB in supporting a policy that other 
concerned donors had challenged on both theoretical 
and practical grounds is consistent with the view that 
policy content matters less than the imperative to meet 
lending targets.188  For a number of years, donors criticised 
subsidies on economic efficiency grounds as well as on 
concerns with the GoT’s capacity to deliver.189  It appears 
that the WB chose to ignore these concerns, including 
the GoT’s delivery capacity. We argue that the WB and 
other lending agencies assume a certain level of capacity 
to manage the state apparatus efficiently at national and 
sub-national levels. This assumption is a prerequisite for 
project loans managed by government to flow, for 
without it, aid of this type would be very difficult to justify. 
The Tanzanian ruling elite actively promotes the illusion 
of capacity, which is useful for its own self image as well 
as for the smooth functioning of the aid machine.
The virtual conspiracy that we and others identify 
between donors and the Tanzanian state is protected by 
relatively low levels of accountability to respective 
constituencies. Though internal evaluations are often 
quite critical of project outcomes, the project mode itself 
continues unabated. Appendix 4 provides an historical 
background to aid to agriculture in Tanzania.
5.0 Discussion and 
tentative conclusions
‘What is striking about many African 
countries is how little trickles down to 
the worse off through patronage network 
and how much sticks to a few hands at 
the top.’190 
Poverty reduction and economic growth are the twin 
policy objectives of Tanzania’s ongoing MKUKUTA. For 
more than a decade, economic growth has been robust 
in sectors other than agriculture, and poverty has fallen 
significantly in Dar es Salaam but not in rural areas. 
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Apparently, neither MKUKUTA in general nor policies 
targeting agriculture directly have had much impact as 
regards reducing poverty or improving livelihoods.191 
Targeting putative benefits on relatively poor farmers is 
clearly unlikely to succeed when rents can be easily 
appropriated by the less poor.
Below we proceed as follows. We review our two 
research questions in order and add a brief discussion 
of possible policy drivers other than the state and donor 
agencies. Then we ask briefly whether private sector 
interests are more significant than previously assumed, 
and how these are linked to the two main actors. 
Research question 1:  To what extent is agricultural 
policy driven by the ruling coalition’s concern with 
securing the rural vote directly through the ballot 
rather than indirectly through clientelism at national 
and lower levels? 
Our review suggests that providing direct benefits to 
farmers in order to assure their political support is not a 
major motivation of the Tanzanian ruling elite, even in 
an increasingly competitive political system. Clientelism 
continues to trump the ballot box. First, though the 
picture is changing quite rapidly, most rural voters 
continue to support the ruling party despite its low 
capacity to deliver concrete benefits through sound 
programmatic policies. Possible explanations include a 
‘better the devil you know...’ attitude among voters, and 
a fear that the ruling party’s propaganda that voting for 
the opposition would inevitably lead to violence and 
bloodshed might be true. In a discussion of livestock 
politics, Leonard et al (2009) maintain that the patronage 
linkage between voters and MPs is heavily weighted in 
favour of the latter. Eking out a precarious existence and 
largely uninformed of what policies their MPs promote 
at the national level, poor rural voters are perforce 
satisfied with occasional handouts in lieu of better 
policies.192
The ruling elite does not yet appear to be excessively 
worried about the potential mass defection of rural voters 
to opposition parties. Second, there are multiple examples 
where policy-as-practice appear to have a negative effect 
on rural voters’ welfare, for example, when RCs ban cross-
border crop sales, local officials shake down small farmers 
and traders at road blocks, the Warehouse Receipt System 
(WRS) presents opportunities for official rent-seeking, 
and the government makes promises (input subsidies, 
irrigation schemes) on which it delivers only partially 
and unevenly.  Third, rural projects are likely to deliver 
few benefits (at perhaps significant cost) to ‘target groups’ 
through inefficiencies and rent-seeking in project 
implementation. In addition, patronage diverts benefits 
away from the mass of poor households towards the 
better off farmers and local elites, who can usually be 
relied upon to bring in the vote. For these reasons we 
expect the rural population to continue to be short-
changed by state policies and practices.193
Policies that intentionally or coincidentally undermine 
private investment at all levels help perpetuate failed 
approaches to agricultural development. The dominant 
discourse justifying state-led agricultural policy is 
strongly normative and ideological. The rural population 
is considered backward, custom-bound and ignorant. 
The incumbents of state power have to protect the small 
farmer against the predatory (‘greedy’, ‘unscrupulous’) 
middleman/trader.194 Public investment in research and 
extension will increase the productivity of land. Benefits 
promised are collective (public goods) not opportunities 
for private risk-taking and accumulation. Narratives of 
‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ in local development 
planning are essentially donor-inspired, and do not 
correspond to the dominant view of the appropriate 
relationship between the state and the rural poor, which 
is paternalistic or laissez faire at best and authoritarian 
and coercive at worst. 
Nationalist sentiments dominate the discussion of 
foreign investment in large-scale agriculture. Many in 
the elite are worried by the potential political 
consequences of foreign investors taking over large areas 
of land and turning small farmers into landless labourers. 
Since colonial times, foreign-owned estates and 
plantations in densely-populated parts of the country 
have been the subject of conflicts over land and water 
rights with local populations. Despite a quarter of a 
century of liberalisation, the GoT still owns hundreds of 
thousands of hectares of estates and ranches that it is 
reluctant to ‘privatise’.195
Unstated anti-market sentiments sometimes help 
undermine formally pro-market projects during 
implementation. For example, the 5th ASDP review 
concluded that the ‘Warehouse receipt system196 is being 
implemented successfully ... on cashew nuts and sesame 
crops ... in Lindi region.’ Yet for cashew there is no rationale 
for a WRS, since the crop is harvested and sold immediately, 
not stored post harvest to wait for prices to improve.197 
The WRS gives cooperative societies a monopoly of 
cashew purchasing and the opportunity to make a 
sizeable rent through arbitrage between sellers and 
buyers.198 Cashew purchases are financed with loans from 
the National Microfinance Bank (NMB), guaranteed by 
the treasury.199 NMB actively supports the WRS: with a 
state guarantee it does not have to worry about the 
creditworthiness of his customer. Cooksey (2008) 
estimates the rent earned by the official middleman in 
the 2007/08 cashew marketing season at over twenty 
million USD. ‘Success’ in implementing the WRS means 
the effective exclusion of the private sector from buying 
specific crops.200 Box 3 gives an example.
Though justified in terms of the expected income and 
welfare benefits to the rural population, agricultural 
policy and its implementation serve primarily the 
interests of key members of the state apparatus, including 
CCM cadres at all levels, state bureaucrats in central and 
local government, parastatal organisations under the 
five ‘agricultural’ ministries, marketing boards and 
cooperative societies.201 Though data are lacking, it is 
likely that the additional funds that the GoT has allocated 
to agriculture in recent years have not been used to create 
value-for-money public goods, despite the enormous 
needs for more and better services of all kinds, but rather 
to service the needs of a diversity of poorly functioning, 
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semi-autonomous state bureaucracies.  Research and 
consultancy interest groups help legitimate state 
agricultural policies and investments, while large 
corporations, project implementers and contractors 
receive a significant proportion of both external and 
internal development funds invested in ‘agriculture’. 
Statist policies emanating from anti-private sector 
values among the ruling coalition serve to undermine 
attempts at agricultural development, which to succeed 
requires cooperation and synergy between public and 
private domains that goes beyond cronyism.  While the 
probity and competence of private agents are frequently 
questioned in public discourse, these qualities are 
routinely taken for granted in the case of the state. 
We return to private interests influencing policy 
below.
 
Research question 2: How has aid influenced 
Tanzanian agricultural policy formulation and 
implementation?
‘The need to burn donor money 
overrules prudence.’202
‘The Bank has had limited success in 
helping address the challengesof 
agricultural development in Africa.’203
Until now, we have posed our research questions 
separately, but empirically the shared interests of donors 
and the ruling elite may be one of the main keys to the 
political economy of Tanzanian agricultural policy. 
Though both sides are formally committed to private 
sector driven growth, their separate and joint activities 
routinely serve to sideline the private sector, privileging 
activities designed to address state rather than market 
failures and to strengthen state rather than market 
institutions.  
Aid agencies attempt to support market-led 
agricultural development through both money and 
projects. Much recent aid from the major agencies has 
taken the form of sector ‘baskets’ and general budget 
The way in which the WRS has been appropriated to serve the interests of the elite demonstrates how donor-
driven policies and projects may be ‘instrumentalised’ during implementation. For example, in March 2012, 
Nanyumbu District Commissioner Ms Fatuma Alli, ‘banned traders who have been buying green grams from 
farmers without using proper weighing machines.’ “Farmers should sell their crops to the primary cooperative 
societies which have been licensed to do the business,” she said. ‘The DC noted that the government had done 
everything to empower cooperative unions to ensure that they buy crops from farmers at reasonable prices.’ “We 
have also introduced the warehouse receipt system to ensure that farmers are benefiting by getting maximum 
price for their crops,” Ms Alli said, noting that there was no reason why farmers should sell their produce to 
fraudulent traders who have been exploiting them.” ‘The DC, who is also the chairperson of the district peace 
and security committee, directed village and ward executives to ensure that they apprehend businessmen who 
would short change farmers by buying the crop at low price or using unauthorised weighing machines.’ ‘ “Buying 
crops at low prices or using weights which have not been authorised is against the law. Businessmen who do so 
should be arrested,” she said.’
Source: Ibadi 2012.
Box 3: Green gram traders exploit farmers
Financed by IFAD, the African Development Bank and Ireland Aid, this USD 43 million project to promote local-
level financial and commercial markets was operating in eight regions by 2008. AMSDP introduced the Warehouse 
Receipt System (WRS), designed to help farmers store produce rather than sell it all at disadvantageous post-
harvest prices (see text). A final internal review of AMSDP and another IFAD initiative, the Rural Financial Services 
Programme (RFSP), worth USD 25m, concluded that ‘there are many positive experiences’ but that ‘the programmes 
have had ... modest influence on the national policy and institutional frameworks for rural finance and agricultural 
marketing.’  ‘RFSP’s support did not result in strong apex organisations for micro and rural finance’. ‘The design 
of both programmes underestimated the challenge of establishing or promoting viable private enterprises.’ 
‘AMSDP was to establish/promote 1,000 viable producer/trader groups and achieved 1,202 of which only 16 per 
cent are self-sustainable.’ ‘A major factor [contributing to high costs in RFSP and AMSDP] has been the combination 
of operating largely in project mode and the ambitious area coverage, distributing relatively limited budgets 
over vast geographical areas and many districts.’ ‘There are serious challenges related to the sustainability of the 
supported beneficiary groups. A relatively large part of the SACCOs struggle with critically low repayment rates 
which threaten their long-term survival.’ 
     Despite AMSDP’s mixed results, IFAD is financing a $90m follow-up project building on the ‘successes’ of its 
predecessor, which is described as a ‘pilot’ project.
Source: Final AMSDP Evaluation 2011, IFAD website accessed 01/01/12
Box 4: How did AMSDP perform?
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support. Both have helped boost the total agriculture 
budget and allowed the GoT to put substantial amounts 
of money into irrigation and input subsidies, with the 
results described above. Despite donor support, Tanzania 
has not met its CAADP target of allocating 10 percent of 
its budget to agriculture, though the trend has been 
generally upwards. 
Second, aid agencies have taken the lead in promoting 
the private sector in agriculture through a large number 
of mostly uncoordinated projects. For example, in FY 
2006/07, there were at least 140 donor-funded activities 
promoting the private sector in agriculture, with total 
commitments of USD 445 million.204 According to Wolter 
(2008), the Agricultural Marketing Systems Development 
Programme (AMSDP) was ‘one of the few projects 
addressing … agricultural marketing.’ 205 Box 4 examines 
its performance.
Area projects like AMSDP have negligible leverage on 
central government on agricultural marketing and 
regulation policy. The plethora of large and small market-
related projects scattered all over the country enjoy no 
overall coordination, synergy or mutual learning. Rarely 
do they admit or react energetically to failure, and are 
lacking in public oversight and popular accountability. 
One experienced observer claimed never to have seen 
a successful WB agriculture project since independence 
50 years ago.206 Globally, success in agriculture does not 
figure in the WB’s five claims for developmental impact 
during the last decade. 207
Virtual collusion between the GoT and donors allows 
both sides to describe projects as ‘satisfactory’ that by 
commercial standards would be described as failures. 
The absence of effective public oversight of donor-
financed/GoT implemented projects allows both sides 
to repeat the underperforming project cycle 
unchallenged, incurring extremely high (but rarely 
mentioned) overhead/transaction costs in the 
process.208
Agricultural projects--both those implemented by 
donors and the GoT--have a miserable track-record 
regarding impact and sustainability. Yet projects continue 
to feature in the armoury of agricultural policy 
implementation, particularly those financed by the WB 
and other lending agencies. These projects supplement 
GoT budgets for the agricultural ministries. One 
respondent was highly critical of donor projects for:
 ‘enabling the agricultural sector lead 
ministries to continue on their selfish, 
inefficient and ineffective paths of 
seminars, training, 4x4s and meetings. This 
masks the need to respond to real-life 
requirements and pressures. They are 
cushioned from these pressures by the 
donor funding...’ 209
We need to explain how repeated failure to achieve 
stated objectives can continue unchallenged for 
extended periods. An independent assessment would 
start from the premise that clientelism is a major driver 
of agricultural policy in Tanzania, and that this helps 
explain why central and local government are so 
inefficient in the provision of public goods. 
At the same time, central and local level regulatory 
practices undermine the confidence of the private sector, 
whose investments impact on agricultural policy. In the 
WB’s 2010 Ease of Doing Business survey, Tanzania ranked 
131st out of 183 countries surveyed (72nd percentile).210 
According to the 2009 survey, Tanzanian taxes are so 
numerous and so complex that most businesses ‘must 
cheat to survive.’ Ambiguity (‘virtually everything appears 
to be negotiable’) and high taxes create a ‘hothouse for 
corruption.’211 According to Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Tanzania scored 
between 2.2 and 3.2/10 between 1999 and 2011, which 
is in the bottom quartile and slightly below the African 
average.212 Cooksey (2011b) describes how processes of 
looting, extortion and rent-seeking undermine the public 
goods and service delivery capacity of the Tanzanian 
state at both central and local levels.
While the regulatory environment discourages 
investment and entrepreneurship, the state justifies an 
interventionist strategy on the grounds that the private 
sector is weak. For example, debating the proposed 
Cereals and Other Produce Bill in October 2009, Minister 
of Agriculture Stephen Wasira said the Cereals and Other 
Produce Board was required because “the free market 
has failed.”213  Yet, neither of the interventions discussed 
in this paper placed any priority on ‘private sector 
development.’ 
The private sector needs to be actively encouraged 
by competitive taxation policies, effective regulation and 
predictable corruption. Failing a dramatic turn-around, 
the highly flawed but well-entrenched state-donor nexus 
will be in charge of agricultural policy for the foreseeable 
future. The following sections examine possible emerging 
political and private sector challenges to this gloomy 
conclusion.
5.1 The political settlement and 
Tanzanian agricultural policy
Tanzania’s ‘political settlement’, defines the broad ‘rules 
of the game’ adhered to by the component parts of 
Tanzania’s ruling elite.214 Tanzania’s political settlement 
has moved from centralised hegemony (single party, 
strong  president, moral as much as material incentives, 
tolerable corruption control, little regionalism) based on 
a heavily rural support-base to a looser alliance around 
the ruling party’s Central Committee, senior bureaucrats, 
and the army where competitive rent-seeking ratchets 
up the cost of the settlement without assuring stability 
over the longer term. 
By African standards, Tanzania is still a relatively well-
integrated polity, reflecting low levels of historically-
derived conflicts based on race, religion, geography, 
ethnicity, or class, and the successful statecraft of the 
country’s first president, which established an 
institutionalised ruling party215 During the 1960s and 
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1970s capitalist tendencies in cooperatives and among 
‘rich’ African farmers and traders were suppressed, while 
European and Asian businesses and rental property were 
nationalised. Until the 1990s, politicians, bureaucrats and 
parastatal employees could not own shares, rental 
property or private companies. The resultant elite 
settlement incorporated all national and regional elites 
under a strong executive that largely managed to control 
opportunistic rent-seeking tendencies. 216
Tanzania’s political settlement is currently in transition 
from a centralised and inclusive single party to a looser 
and more competitive model. Competitive politics in the 
1990s saw the rise of new political parties to challenge 
the hegemony of CCM, while economic liberalisation 
removed the constraint on public servants engaging in 
private business, opening the door to ‘money politics’. 
In the first multiparty elections in 1995 opposition parties 
obtained nearly two firths of the popular vote, but CCM 
strengthened its position in 2000, with significant 
increases in both presidential and parliamentary 
majorities (Table 4). In 2005, President Kikwete trumped 
his predecessor’s performance and opposition 
presidential candidates performed poorly, though there 
was little change in CCM’s (huge) parliamentary 
majority.
But in the most recent elections (November 2010) the 
opposition made significant inroads into both presidential 
and parliamentary majorities, reflecting a substantial rise 
in the opposition vote and a very low voter turn-out.  217 
Nationally, only 8.4 million voters out of 20.1 million 
registered (43 percent) actually voted in the 2010 
elections.  218 Though most of the seats won by the 
opposition parties were in urban constituencies, the rural 
voter seems to have voted with his/her feet, abstaining 
in large numbers. These results suggest that the ruling 
party is under increasing pressure to deliver tangible 
benefits to rural voters if it is to retain its dominance of 
Tanzanian politics. We would thus expect to see more 
programmatic policy initiatives aimed at the rural vote. 
Yet, with the arrival of Kilimo Kwanza and related 
initiatives discussed further below, official ‘policy’ is 
veering away from exclusive concerns with smallholder 
productivity and poverty reduction and towards 
encouraging large-scale commercial agriculture based 
on substantial foreign investments and land 
acquisitions.
The party bosses’ attempts to retain pan-elite unity 
under the ruling party is threatened by the emergence 
of rival internal clientelist networks of senior politicians, 
bureaucrats and businessmen. The currently dominant 
faction that orchestrated President Kikwete’s 2005 and 
2010 election strategy is challenged internally by a 
minority faction concerned that growing political 
corruption will weaken the economy and strengthen the 
hand of opposition parties. Since the reintroduction of 
political competition, aspirants to political office have 
increasingly vied for political support with war chests 
financed directly through looting state coffers and/or 
indirectly through deals with foreign and local 
businessmen. 219 There is a view that looting, rent-seeking, 
land grabbing and natural resource plunder are 
increasingly costly consequences of heightened political 
competition within the ruling party.
Signs of a loosening of the centralised hegemony of 
the ruling party’s settlement since liberalisation are said 
to be the increasing influence of lower-level elites 
through decentralisation, control of land allocation, and 
the selection of parliamentary candidates. 220  The security 
of tenure of CCM incumbent MPs has fallen as a result, 
raising the possibility of defections to opposition parties 
when incumbents are not reselected. The weakening of 
central control of the political selection process allows 
for local state-private-civil society relationships to come 
more into play.
The settlement is also under threat from urbanisation, 
which reduces the importance of the rural vote, 
traditionally the core support of the ruling party and 
from the decline of ujamaa as an ideological force. The 
press has revealed excesses at the top, but accountability 
still remains inadequate.   For the moment, the majority 
of senior CCM officials, bureaucrats and the military are 
in the President’s camp, but this could change, depending 
on conjunctural politicking and the opposition’s unity 
and popularity in the build-up to the next elections.
Finally, the role of aid has to be factored into the 
political settlement. Di John and Putzel (2009:18) see a 
possible two-way relationship:
Not only does the political settlement 
set the constraints for what can and cannot 
be accomplished with foreign assistance, 
but foreign assistance itself can have an 
impact on the political settlement. This 
analytical framework provides a window 
for donors to grasp the politics of a place 
in order to design more effective 
interventions.
The manner in which this interaction between aid and 
the political settlement works over time is a story yet to 
Table 4: Electoral results during the multiparty era, 1995 to date 
1995 2000 2005 2010
Presidential (% votes) 61.8 38.2 71.7 28.3 80.3 19.7 62.8 37.2
Parliament (% seats) 80.2 19.8 87.5 12.5 88.8 11.2 75.4 24.6
Local Councils (% seats) 96.8 3.2 91.7 8.3 92.9 7.1 84.0 16.0
Village/Hamlet (% seats) - - - - 94.6 5.4 97.2 2.8 91.7 8.3
Source: USAID 2010; National Electoral Commission (www.nec.go.tz); Chaligha 2008; Wikipedia 24/11/11
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be told. Our working hypothesis is that the aggregate 
impact of aid is massively supportive of Tanzania’s 
state-led agricultural policy, providing additional 
recurrent and development funds that fuel the clientelistic 
practices of the state bureaucracy at all levels.  Far from 
stimulating policy reflection and debate, on balance, aid 
reinforces the anti-market approach to agricultural policy. 
221
We conclude with some observations on the role of 
local and external business interests on the political 
settlement and agricultural policy during a period of 
trade and investment liberalisation. 
5.2 Business and agricultural policy
How do private interests influence the political 
settlement and agricultural policy? With the arrival of 
Kilimo Kwanza in 2008, official agricultural policy took a 
sharp turn towards large-scale investment in agriculture. 
In support of this policy, discussed further below, the 
Tanzanian Investment Centre set up a ‘land bank’ and 
some large foreign investments are underway, usually 
brokered by senior members of the ‘system.’
Since liberalisation, local private interests (largely 
Asian and Arab) have begun to penetrate the political 
centre.  According to Hoeffler:
‘Within agricultural sub-sectors, the 
continuous existence of quasi-monopolies 
in commodity marketing, trade or 
processing demonstrates that the struggle 
against patronage and corruption is far 
from over.’222
Regional and global grain markets are key components 
of the agricultural policy story. It has been common for 
the GoT to ban cereal exports to neighbouring countries 
in the name of food security. For example, in May 2008, 
the Minister of Agriculture banned exports of all food 
crops pending the results of ‘an ongoing food assessment’ 
by his ministry and the PMO. Global food shortages and 
price increases had discouraged ‘some local traders’ from 
importing maize. In January of the same year, the Minister 
had suspended maize exports after ‘establishing apparent 
cereal shortages’, leading the GoT to ‘waive tax on 
imported maize ... in order to enable local traders to 
import 300,000 tonnes of maize.’ 223
‘claim that an oligopoly of importers 
actively seek to influence the perceptions 
of food crises by influencing the media to 
write about impending food shortages. 
The aim is to influence politicians to allow 
food imports at lower duty rates. When 
ministry of finance recently tried to 
question the validity of a food security 
assessment, it eventually had to back 
down.’ 224
If there is collusion between ‘a powerful lobby of grain 
importers’ and the GoT which allows the former to ignore 
the East African Community’s (EAC) Common External 
Tariff (CET), then it  must be incorporated as an important 
piece of our understanding of agricultural ‘policy’.225 
Politically well-connected companies obtain access 
to major rent-making opportunities, while politically 
un-connected companies get little or no official support 
and are vulnerable to the extortive behaviour of the TRA 
and officialdom in general. As in other sectors, there is 
a ‘missing middle’ of commercial farmers and farm service 
providers, reflecting the difficulties and costs of doing 
business in a hostile legal and regulatory environment.
In 2008, the anti-private sector bias of official policy 
often complained about by donor agencies was 
challenged by the arrival of Kilimo Kwanza (KK), the latest 
framework for agriculture sector development, 
superseding the ASDS/ASDP. KK was formulated by the 
Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC).226 Although 
it is said to be ‘private-sector driven’, Kilimo Kwanza is 
structured in a surprisingly similar way to the ASDP, with 
a heavy GoT presence in the majority of components 
and dozens of activities supposedly involving multiple 
coordinated actors.227 Tanzania’s horticulture strategy has 
the same claim to be private-sector driven, and the same 
complex blueprint for implementation, with a major role 
for the state.228
The potential for rent-seeking within KK has been 
highlighted with the importation of Indian-made tractors 
and power tillers in a deal involving SUMA JKT, the army’s 
commercial wing, and a local trading company that was 
involved in the External Payments Account scam in the 
Bank of Tanzania.229 Funded with a USD 40m soft loan 
from the Indian government, 1,860 tractors, 400 power 
tillers and other farming implements were to be imported. 
By early 2011, most of these remained unsold, and were 
said to be gathering dust in Lugalo Barracks, outside Dar 
es Salaam.230
Other potentially important external influences on 
agricultural policy come from the private corporate 
sector, the international community, and private 
philanthropies. The driving forces for these increasing 
external interests are the threat of global food shortages, 
rising energy costs and efforts to reduce carbon emissions. 
The UN promotes the Alliance for the Green Revolution 
in Africa (AGRA), which receives massive funding inter 
alia from the Gates Foundation. The Comprehensive 
Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) 
under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) is another major initiative to increase farm 
productivity. CAADP aims at attaining a budget 
commitment of 10 percent of total spending and 6 
percent annual growth for agriculture to help achieve 
Millennium Development Goal 1 (cutting hunger by half 
by 2015). 231 Major agribusiness corporations put together 
public-private investment consortia, with mandates to 
increase food security and generate exports. DFID has 
created a ‘challenge fund’ for investment in African 
agribusiness.232  And so on.
By invitation from President Kikwete, the Norwegian 
fertiliser giant YARA recently entered the Tanzanian 
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market and is already supplying 40 percent of the fertiliser 
consumed in the country.233  YARA says it has invested 
USD 20 million in bulk storage capacity at Dar es Salaam 
harbour in anticipation of growing commercial fertiliser 
imports. YARA supplies unsubsidised fertiliser for the 
tobacco industry on the basis of an annual competitive 
tender. YARA is a member of SAGCOT (the Southern 
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania), a public-
private consortium of 23 official and large international 
commercial interests, farmers’ groups and the GoT, with 
ambitious plans to develop market chains for smallholders 
and large-scale farms.234
YARA has been actively lobbying major donor agencies 
to get them to share the risk of major private investments 
in relatively insecure African markets.235 It claims success 
in ‘rolling out’ its multi-sector value chain approach in a 
number of Tanzanian districts.236
The growing global interest in biofuels has led to the 
rapid acquisition of large areas of land in numerous 
African countries, including Tanzania, by a range of 
external players of all sizes and degrees of integrity.237 
External and local opposition to the new ‘land grab’ 
suggests that foreign investors may find it difficult to 
enforce their land and water rights. Early investments 
have not been particularly successful, with at least one 
European investor pulling out prematurely.
What is the potential impact of these new external 
actors and initiatives on national agricultural policy and 
practice? On the one hand, the involvement of the 
international community in promoting the green 
revolution could be seen as unlikely to influence 
Tanzanian policy, based as it is on traditional technical 
approaches to increasing land productivity. This plays 
into the hands of the GoT by endorsing statist solutions 
to the chronic problem of agricultural underdevelopment. 
On the other hand, agribusiness interests in commercial 
farming, backed with market influence and donor 
support, might stand a better chance of influencing 
Tanzanian policy. Whether or not this would be a good 
thing remains to be seen.
Key issues for policy are the relations between local 
and external ‘private’ interests. Local interests could be 
expected to lobby to limit foreign investments in land-
extensive projects, ban certain imports, or reserve certain 
sectors for local businesses.  Joint ventures are a possible 
solution to the external-internal problem. It is only natural 
for existing patronage networks controlling key imports 
to protect their monopolies against external attempts 
to dismantle them.238  It would be hard to identify a local 
pro-market agricultural lobby favouring a radical opening 
of agricultural investment and trade, including 
agribusiness multinationals.239
If the experience of the mining sector is any guide, 
state support for agribusiness could wane quite rapidly. 
Land and human rights groups and adverse media 
coverage and commentary might provide the stimulus 
for such a change in policy. The ruling elite would not 
want to be associated with policies that appeared to take 
land away from semi-subsistence farmers to produce 
bio-fuels.
6.0 Research
The political economy of Tanzanian agricultural policy 
is not widely researched, and consequently this has been 
a partial and largely exploratory study. Lack of research 
and data on critical issues have thwarted the analysis at 
critical junctures. We know little of the manner in which 
various interest groups--endogenous and exogenous, 
public and private--influence policy making and 
implementation240  through formal and informal means. 
Past research has focused almost exclusively on the state 
and donor agencies as drivers of agricultural policy. 
Economic analysis of agriculture has more or less ignored 
underlying political factors influencing policy formulation 
and implementation. In recent years, the forces of 
globalisation and philanthro-capitalism have brought 
new actors onto the scene, making ‘policy’ an increasingly 
difficult concept to operationalise.
A comprehensive scoping exercise is required to map 
the main players and their interactions. Rent theory 
provides a promising analytical framework to structure 
these interactions, and to link them to larger questions 
of economic transformation and poverty reduction. If, 
as recent research suggests, the strategic political role 
of local elites is increasing, what are the means by which 
the political centre attempts to secure their support for 
the existing elite settlement? How do opposition parties 
strategise around this issue? More generally, is deepening 
democracy the harbinger of more ‘programmatic’ policies 
or more short-term efforts to buy off farmers with 
transfers such as input subsidies? 
We noted the enormous gaps in our understanding 
of the functioning of the Tanzanian agricultural 
bureaucracy, suggesting other priorities for future 
research. More research is required to understand the 
interface between the state, donors and the new external 
actors. The big issues include: (1) whether a new external-
internal alliance might arise to challenge the traditional 
hegemony of the donor-supported state, and (2) what 
the implications of such an alliance might be for the fates 
of Tanzanian subsistence and commercial agriculture. 
Though quantitative evidence is lacking, there are signs 
that a class of medium- to large-scale Tanzanian farmers 
is beginning to emerge, based in part on rents captured 
from acquiring land at below market prices. How do the 
external and internal forces relate to each other?
Is there a trend towards more local political autonomy, 
with local elites extracting more rent opportunities form 
the centre in exchange for allegiance and ‘bringing in 
the vote’? How do local agribusinesses protect their 
interests against external competition? Anecdotal 
evidence of investors losing land titles and litigation in 
conflicts with state or business interests (JV partners, 
local competitors) needs to be fleshed out with more 
systematic research.
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Donors remain key actors. The manner in which the 
interaction between aid and the political settlement 
works over time is a story yet to be told. How does aid 
affect the ‘elite bargain’? What more can be said about 
the ‘implicit conspiracy’ between government and 
donors? We are used to discussing aid in terms of ‘success’ 
versus ‘failure’, but the actual impact of aid has not been 
seriously addressed. Measuring aid impact poses serious 
methodological problems, however. 
At a lower level, more independent assessments of 
projects are required for a better understanding of their 
nature and impact.  Regarding the small-scale irrigation 
projects, for example, we have no information on the 
fairness or technical quality of the screening process, or 
the degree to which patronage is involved. Partial indirect 
evidence cited above suggests that the pattern of DADP 
financing is unrelated to irrigation potential, but more 
research is required. The actual distribution of input 
vouchers would tell us a lot about the underlying forces 
determining ‘policy in practice.’ 
The practical difficulties involved in undertaking such 
a research programme--accessing sensitive data, 
challenging state and donor discourses, assessing actual 
as opposed to claimed policy/project impacts, examining 
rent-seeking practices and their effects--should not be 
underestimated. 
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finance management that exist at Local Government 
level.’
79 Mayunga 2009. 
80 Chidawali 2012.
81 World Bank 2010: Annex 7. Meta-analysis may 
consider the possibility that aid agencies routinely 
overestimate implementation capacity at central 
and local levels out of necessity. It follows that 
donors are equally likely to assess implementation 
performance more leniently than the ‘facts’ justify. 
82 Sectors that routinely fail the sustainability test 
include: subsidised agricultural inputs, research and 
extension; agricultural marketing; rural (and urban) 
domestic water supply;   construction; electricity 
infrastructure; ...
83 URT 2010. Forty-six of the 60 reviewers were GoT 
officials, and most of the non-civil servants on the 
team (N=14) were Tanzanians working for the WB, 
IFAD, AfDB, FAO, ACT, JICA and Irish Aid (URT 2010, 
Appendix 2). Review teams visited projects selected 
by district authorities.
84 The issue is not even mentioned in the executive 
summary. Therkildsen 2010:16.
85 Given that LGAs generally decide on which projects 
are to be visited by review teams, the average 
performance of irrigation schemes is likely to be 
even worse than that portrayed in the reviews’ 
findings.
86  Therkildsen 2011.  
87 Performance in extending irrigation before ASDP 
started was thought to be better than this, though 
we cannot know for sure (Respondent J, personal 
communication).
88 Therkildsen 2011:17. Similarly impressive 
improvements in yields are reported for beans and 
maize.
89 Historically, those who controlled the water supply 
for irrigation were the rulers of what Witfögel 
(Oriental Despotism) called ‘hydraulic’ societies. 
Developing irrigated agriculture is as much a 
political as an agro-technical issue.
90 The bleakest comment on ASDP comes from a 
seasoned researcher (respondent J) who argues that 
‘ASDP is an empty shell ... or a dead duck! It is just 
the documents. When you spend a few days on it 
and visit a few sites you will discover that there is 
hardly anything on the ground to show for it. These 
things are written largely to attract funding support 
from donors and when the funds come they are 
distributed “among themselves” and the farmer gets 
“f..k all” as usual’  (via email, 25/07/11).
91 Poulton (personal communication) suggests that 
Kikwete may have hoped for a “first term” effect – 
showing by 2010 that he was delivering for 
agriculture as his predecessor had not.
92 Or TShs 85,000,000 at October 2011 exchange 
rates.
93 Allocating potential rent-earning opportunities to 
lower levels of the ‘system’ could be considered as 
forms of patronage spending at the centre (see 
Cooksey and Kelsall 2011 and Cooksey 2011a).
94 Poulton 2011:4.
95 Bourgouin, Therkildsen and Geelan 2011:8. Perhaps 
‘influence’ would be a more appropriate term.
96 This could be viewed as a basic principal-agent 
problem where the supervisory/sanctioning role of 
the principal (central government) breaks down. 
The centre simply does not have the resources, 
including information, to hold the periphery to 
account. 
97 Campaigners argued inter alia that it was 
unconstitutional for MPS to be both overseers of 
government spending and recipients of discretionary 
funds to spend themselves. Lwinga 2009; Kiria, 2009; 
Mwita 2009. 
98 Tsubura 2012.
99 Greeley (2008:21). ‘Clearly the DIDF resource 
envelope is effectively controlled from the centre.’ 
100 Therkildsen, comments on the draft report.
101 Apart from irrigation, ASDP has three other main 
components: planning, implementation and 
coordination, agricultural services (research, 
extension and mechanization), and marketing and 
private sector development. On extension, in 2008 
the Minister of Agriculture committed the 
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government to a target of one extension officer per 
village by the year 2011 (Haule 2008). All told, ASDP 
plans to recruit 11,703 and 13,469 agricultural and 
livestock extension officers by the year 2013 (Staff 
Writer 2008).  This is a classic supply-driven policy. 
In practice, extensionists and farmers do not get on 
very well with each other.
102 Lewis et al. 2008:53. Tanzania Agricultural Partnership 
(TAP) has tried to increase private sector involvement 
in ASDP by incorporating a Commodity Investment 
Plan (CIP) in DADPs (Thisday Reporter 2008). 
103 Lewis et al. ibid., the final quote is from Wolter 
(2008).
104 For a more recent formulation see Planning 
Commission (1999:11): ‘Tanzanians have developed 
a propensity to prepare … plans and programmes, 
and ambitions which are not accompanied by 
effective implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms. As a result, implementation 
has been weak.’
105 See Therkildsen 1988.
106 The programme’s other sub-components, 
implemented directly by the agricultural ministries, 
involved a lot of ‘capacity building’, training and 
procurement. It is possible that substantial rents 
have accrued to politicians and officials through the 
management of these components.
107 Greeley 2008:2.
108 Bilateral projects are generally implemented by 
consulting companies. USAID is the main example. 
Principal-agent problems and ‘moral hazard’ 
apply. 
109 See Berkman 2008 for a detailed exposé of how WB 
projects are corrupted in West Africa and how WB 
procedures are ineffective in addressing abuses. 
Kramer (2007) describes corruption in international 
aid tendering. No systematic evidence exists for WB 
and other projects implemented in Tanzania, though 
anecdotal evidence and the pervasiveness of rent-
seeking in the Tanzanian state apparatus lead us to 
suspect that such abuse is systemic (Cooksey 2011a). 
See Knack (2000) for evidence that aid dependency 
exacerbates poor governance and corruption. 
110 Wolter 2008:25.  Emphasis added.  
111 Ateba (1999:1). The same applies to other 
agencies.
112 Mosoba 2008. Emphasis added. Dr Kigoda also 
‘denounced the “prohibitive bureaucracy” placed 
on large-scale investors keen to play a role in the 
sector.’ 
113 Therkilsden 2011.
114 In January 2012, the WB announced a $14m irrigated 
rice project loan to the GoT designed ‘to enable 
farmers to access and use agricultural knowledge, 
technology, marketing systems and infrastructure.’ 
(Ndeketela 2012).  The IDA is administering Japanese 
funds provided under the Policy and Human 
Resource Development (PHRD) mechanism.
115 OPM et al 2005:47. MPs were neither consulted nor 
‘informed prior to the announcement in the National 
Assembly.’
116 OPM et al 2005:47. What’s more, the move ‘was not 
supported by any comprehensive technical analysis.’ 
See above for Hyden’s observation that policies tend 
not to be ‘evidence-based.’
117 It appears that MAFS attempted more than once to 
‘slip in’ support for subsidies into the MKUKUTA 
“hoping that no one would notice” (OPM et al 
2005:47). 
118 The regions were Iringa, Rukwa, Mbeya, Ruvuma, 
Morogoro, Manyara, Kilimanjaro, Kigoma, Arusha, 
and Mara (Niyibitanga 2008).
119 URT 2010. The  GoT allocated TShs 68,310,300,000 
and IDA allocated TShs 64,683,871,200 to facilitate 
the implementation of NAVS.
120 URT 2011:21.
121 Therkildsen 2011:7.
122 Broadly, Iringa gained at the expense of the three 
other regions, while production in Arusha and 
Morogoro also increased.
123 Fertiliser use fell to 63,000 tonnes in 1989, the lowest 
level since 1973 (Skarstein 2010:116). 
124 Binswanger-Mkhize and Gautam 2010:63, citing 
World Bank 2000. Fertiliser subsidies reached 80 
percent of the retail price in 1988. This challenges 
the view that the take-up of fertiliser in the Southern 
Highlands constituted a ‘green revolution’ 
(Rasmussen 1986, cited by Skarstein 2010:117) and 
suggests remarkable inefficiency in fertiliser use. 
125 Binswanger-Mkhize and Gautam 2010:60. 
126 REPOA 2007 
127 Only two in five respondents claimed to have ever 
used natural fertiliser, which helps explain the 
declining soil fertility and yields noted in the 
literature.
128 The survey also shows that both poorer and less 
poor farmers had little contact with extension 
officers. Input prices and input availability 
constituted ‘major problems’ for 87% and 77% of 
poor farmers, and 82% and 64% of the least poor.
129 Iringa has the second highest regional income per 
capita in Tanzania after Dar es Salaam, followed by 
Ruvuma, with Mbeya ranking 6thand Rukwa 10th 
( National Accounts of Tanzania Mainland 2000 – 
2010, p 41).
130 Extracted from MAFS (2011) input subsidies data 
base.  If Morogoro is included (7.8% of all fertiliser), 
these five regions, Dar es Salaam’s main  sources of 
maize, account for 56% of all fertiliser distribute 
nationwide. 
131 National Bureau of Statistics 2007; REPOA 2007.
Working Paper 040 www.future-agricultures.org32
132 Appendix 3 shows a range from 98 percent of the 
poorest to 69 percent of less poor farmers nationwide 
who never used chemical fertiliser (a range of 29 
percentage points) compared to 77 and 27 percent 
respectively in Iringa (50 percentage points).  Note 
that the poor Iringa farmers were also much more 
likely than poor farmers nationwide to have used 
chemical fertiliser (23 versus 2 percent). 
133 National Bureau of Statistics 2007:154.
134 There were only nine other unopposed constituencies 
in the entire country (NEC 2010). 
135 National Electoral Commission website, accessed 
04/11/11. Njombe Urban is the seat of the current 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Anna 
Makinda. Other prominent CCM politicians from the 
region are William Lukuvi (Ismani) and Prof Peter 
Msolla (Kilolo). In Njombe West, Chadema polled 
30.3 percent of votes cast, suggesting that CCM 
hegemony is under threat.
136 Note that the costs and benefits accrue to different 
interest groups--costs to tax payers/donors versus 
benefits to maize producers/middlemen/ 
consumers). To our knowledge, this has not been 
an issue of public debate.
137 See Table 3 for corroborative evidence. 
138 See also Bourgouin, Therkildsen and Geelan 2011. 
139 This section summarises Agriculture Reference 
Group, 2004.
140 Tanzanian expert opinion was against subsidies on 
the grounds that they are ‘wide open to abuse, and 
that most of the benefit tends to accrue to traders 
and rich farmers’ (OPM et al. 2005:48). 
141 In addition, unnecessary bureaucracy in MAFS 
increased the risks and reduced the profits of 
fertiliser importers. 
142 ‘Fallowing and using organic matter may become 
unattractive when free or subsidised fertiliser is 
available. Other technologies, such as minimum 
tillage/conservation farming, for example, or low 
input agro-forestry, are in some cases superior 
alternatives’ (AGR 2004). However, few farmers use 
organic fertiliser (see Box 2 above). 
143 In 2008, the WB committed to increase lending to 
African agriculture ‘to curb food shortages’. (Navuri 
2008).  
144 Respondent C, 25/03/11. WB projects often ignore 
the Banks’ own analytical work. For example,  a 
recent IEG evaluation of WB support for agriculture 
and agribusiness in Africa concluded that ‘... the 
findings from [the Bank’s own] analytical work [have 
not] strategically informed Bank client policy 
dialogue and lending program design.’ (IEG 2011). 
145 Respondent C, 25/03/11. In June 2008, President 
‘Kikwete sought WB support to enable local farmers 
access affordable imported fertilisers...’ (Tarimo 
2008).
146 When fertiliser is sold commercially, the majority of 
farmers not buying it claim price to be the 
impediment. In Iringa in 2002/03, 81% of farmers 
not using chemical fertiliser cited price as the reason. 
This accounted for half of all crop-growing 
households in the region ( URT 2007:201, 207).  
147 Ministry of Agriculture, NAIVS voucher data (excel 
file 01 10).
148  We may assume that the 40,000 difference between 
the two figures represents better-off farmers.
149 The current voucher scheme was introduced in 2008, 
replacing the original scheme of 2003, which was 
turned into a rent-seeking exercise. 
150 MAFC 2010 (translation by Virdiana Mushema). The 
11 member committee has a representative from 
farmers groups, agents, companies (?) and the NMB, 
which manages the scheme’s finances.
151  The fact that the input distributors were hand-
picked by the MAFS suggests collusion ab initio. 
152 This is a polite way of saying ‘very poor’, and would 
be considered outright failure in the real world.
153 URT 2010:35.
154 URT 2010:36.
155 URT 2010:30 (Emphasis withheld).
156 CAG 2010:7. ‘Unqualified’ means that formal 
procurement procedures and Credit Agreement 
financial regulations and provisions were followed. 
However, site visits were undertaken to selected 
districts ‘to assess physical progress and achievement 
(sic) of the Project.’ The CAG adds the caveat that: 
‘As an auditor, I am not required to specifically search 
for fraud; therefore my audit cannot be relied upon 
to disclose all such matters’ (CAG 2010:4). See text 
below for CAG queries on AFSP spending.
157 One senior official employed a Kiswahili saying to 
describe rent-seeking practices related to the input 
subsidies: ‘mbuzi anakula urefu ya mkanda yake’ 
(‘the goat eats according to the length of its tether’) 
(Interview C), suggesting that higher-level looting 
is a major problem. 
158 Respondent C, 25/03/11.
159 Sanchawa 2008.   
160 Civil society plays a very minor role in agricultural 
policy making and advocacy, though an umbrella 
organisation for non-state actors has been 
established. By contrast, there have been substantial 
civil society contributions to education and health 
policy, expenditure monitoring, budget analysis, 
and informed critical commentary. 
161 Anon 2011.  
162 CAG report for 2008/08 cited by agricultural 
economist Damian Gabagambi (Joseph 2009).
163 Siyame 2010. 
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164 Daily News Reporter 2011. PCCB were investigating 
accusations of ‘gross mismanagement’ in the input 
voucher scheme in Rufiji.
165 Kimaryo 2011. The quote continues: “The feeling 
among many villagers is that … something fishy is 
going on.”
166 Letter to the editor, Thisday, 4 September 2011. 
167 AgCLIR Tanzania 2010. 
168 In other cases two farmers club together to redeem 
a voucher. Vouchers are provided for seeds, fertiliser 
for planting and for supporting growth. It appears 
that the minimum 50 kg bag of fertiliser is sometimes 
sold in smaller units. 
169 Fundisha 2009. 
170 OPM (2005:48).
171 Pan and Christiaensen (2011:i).
172 Stein 2011. Wealth rankings were based on imputed 
income. Manyara received 62,400 maize vouchers 
in 2009, or 4.3% of the national total (MAFS input 
database 2011). 
173 Mgussi 2011. The forgers ‘should be taken to task.’ 
174 Tanzania Corruption Tracker 2011:1. Mr Cheyo is 
quoted as saying:  “In the eyes of the committee, we 
see power tiller as nothing more than a project for 
benefiting district commissioners, divisional 
secretaries and village executives rather than poor, 
small scale farmers.”
175 CAG 2009. This report also claims that ‘The Ministry 
overpaid Shs. 257,416,122 to M/s Smith & Ouzman 
Ltd of UK for printing 2,350,000 input vouchers at 
a contract sum of UK £308,555 which is equivalent 
to Shs.674,192,675.’
176 URT (2010:30).
177 Cooksey and Kelsall (2011) highlight the inability of 
the executive to control lower-level looting and elite 
capture by state officials in an administrative system 
lacking a central coordination mechanism for key 
rent transfers. 
178 At the time, the voucher scheme was still quite 
small.
179 The question was open-ended and post-coded.
180 At the time of the survey the subsidy was quite 
modest. 
181 The second round of Views of the People (2012) will 
examine this issue. 
182 As recently as 2007, over two in five Tanzanians (41%) 
preferred a one-party (ie CCM-run) polity, marginally 
less than those who were glad the country had 
adopted a multi-party system (45%). Rural opinions 
were almost identical to the national average 
(REPOA 2007).
183 Barasa 2008.
184 It is worth remembering that the other components 
of ASDP bring considerable financial resources to 
the five agriculture ministries, some of which may 
be consumed in clientelism and patronage 
spending.  
185 URT 2011:21.
186 See the discussion around Table 4.
187 Personal communication, respondent D. TFC is 
apparently not paying the plant, forcing its closure. 
This is yet to be corroborated. 
188 It has always been thus: the WB helped bankroll the 
ujamaa policies that caused the Tanzanian economy 
to implode in the 1970s and 1980s.
189 An efficient state bureaucracy is more likely to 
deliver the benefits of subsidies than an inefficient 
one. Even then, input subsidies are arguably a poor 
policy choice except as a short-term measure. 
190 Willliams 1987: 639.
191 The relative success stories (sugar, tea, cotton) 
involve outgrower and contract schemes based on 
private factories/ginneries. 
192 The authors argue that MPs may well support 
policies inimical to their constituents’ interests and 
that it may be in MPs’ interests to keep their voters 
poor and uninformed. Lacking the necessary tools 
to analyse policy options, voters are more concerned 
that their MPs represent their interests at the political 
centre. Cited by Poulton (2011:20).
193 Asked whether they thought foreign aid mostly 
benefited state officials or the poor majority, 81% 
the respondents in the 2007 Views of the People 
survey who offered an opinion chose the first option 
(REPOA 2007). 
194 Cooksey and Kelsall (2011) and Cooksey (2011b) cite 
ideology as an important source of disaccord 
between the state and private, especially foreign, 
business interests. We do not have space to discuss 
the role of ideology in this paper.
195 Many of the incumbents of state power also have 
private companies: internally, it is (traditionally 
‘Asian’) merchant capital that they oppose, not the 
capitalist mode of production per se.
196 The Tanzania Warehouse Act was passed in June 
2005. Billed as a means of setting farmers free from 
middlemen, the GoT plans to extend the system to 
cover the entire country. The WRS is the brainchild 
of the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) (Navuri 
2008). In theory an excellent idea, the WRS will 
succeed or fail on the quality of its organisation and 
management.  
197 Traders come to buy Tanzanian cashew during a 
specific period, when the current harvest must be 
sold.
198 This is not the only scenario. During the 2011-12 
buying season, the cashew board (CBT) set a price 
for cashew that traders were unwilling to pay, 
leaving many thousands of tones of unsold cashew 
in the cooperatives’ warehouses. Farmers were 
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unlikely to receive their ‘second payments’ for 
cashew delivered to the warehouse. 
199 In the event that cooperative loans turn bad, they 
are paid out of taxes. This happens quite 
frequently.  
200 Promoted by IFAD, the WRS was not designed as an 
anti-private trader initiative, though it was intended 
as a means of increasing farm-gate prices. In March 
2012, President Kikwete expressed his support for 
the WRS. According to Rugonzibwa 2012: ‘The 
Warehouse receipt system is here to stay and the 
government will protect it against any attempt to 
sabotage or kill it.’ 
201 Space prevents a full treatment, but the relative 
revival of agricultural cooperatives in recent years, 
energetically promoted by former minister 
responsible for Cooperative Development George 
Kahama, has not served the interests of farmers in 
general, though the better-off are more enthusiastic 
about cooperative marketing than poorer farmers. 
Cooperatives have benefited from the spread of the 
WRS.
202 Email observation, respondent D, 26/03/11.
203 http://go.worldbank.org/MYRZCGW230, accessed 
28/01/12.
204 Wolter 2008. The largest single item is USD 280 
million for infrastructure (14 donors). The actual 
number of projects is likely to be higher since NGOs 
and non-DAC donors such as China or the Arab Bank 
for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) are 
not included in the total. Donors such as USAID 
operate mainly outside GoT structures. 
205 Wolter, citing Greeley (2007) and World Bank (2008). 
Emphasis added.
206 Respondent A. 
207 DFID 2011.  The ‘top 5’ IDA claims were: immunised 
310 million children; provided 113 million people 
with an improved water source; provided basic 
health, nutrition and population services to 47 
million people; improved the quality of teaching 
and facilities for 105 million children; given 26 
million people access to an all-season road. Note 
also there is only one achievement with direct 
relevance for market development. 
208 The ‘allowances culture’ that has developed in aid 
dependent countries owes its existence in no small 
part to the training and capacity building activities 
favoured by donor projects (Cooksey 2010).  
209 Respondent D, email 25/03/11.
210 Malawi and Mozambique were 132nd and 135th 
respectively, Kenya 95th, and Botswana 45th. World 
Bank 2009, www.doingbusiness.org.
211 World Bank 2009. www.doingbusiness.org.
212 Transparency International, www.transparency.org, 
various years.
213 ‘The government has decided to intervene by 
buying crops directly from farmers, because 
liberalization in the sector (free market) has failed.’ 
(Mwakalebela 2009).
214 Di John and Putzel 2008. The term ‘elite bargain’ is 
also used in the literature.
215 The exception to this rule is Zanzibar, though a 
recent classic elite bargain may have introduced a 
new era of relative ‘peace and tranquillity’.
216 See Cooksey and Kelsall (2011) for a summary.
217 Legal and Human Rights Centre and TACCEO 
2010:143.
218 NEC 2011: xxiii. We do not have urban-rural 
diasggregations. 
219 See Cooksey 2011a and Cooksey and Kelsall 2011 
for the rise of Tanzanian money politics. 
220 It is worth noting that at the lower levels of electoral 
representation, CCM hegemony is almost total, 
though there was a slight tailing off in 2010 (Table 
3). 
221 ‘On balance’ implies that the positive achievements 
of aid agencies (and INGOs and local CSOs) in 
addressing local constraints on household income 
and welfare are outweighed by the moral hazard 
effects. For example, virtually all the new agriculture-
relevant ministry headquarters and departments 
in Dar es Salaam have been financed by WB loans. 
A market-led aid regime would ask first what useful 
functions (if any) central ministries serve for the 
public good. (See Future Agricultures 2007 on the 
advantages of limited direct state involvement in 
solving market failures). Large foreign investments 
in agriculture might have the welcome effect of 
reducing the central importance of the MAFS in the 
overall institutional architecture governing the 
sector.  
222 Hoeffler 2011:42. Therkildsen (2011) names some 
of these interests.
223 Daily News reporter 2008. Regional export bans were 
lifted in advance of the 2010 elections.
224 Therkildsen 2011:21.
225 Therkildsen 2011:22-23.
226 Other relevant private actors include the Agricultural 
Council of Tanzania (ACT), formerly the Tanzania 
Chamber of Agriculture and Livestock, which brings 
together a range of agricultural stakeholders. ACT’s 
executive director is a former Director of Planning 
in MAFC.  ACT and Agriculture Non-State Actors 
Forum (ANSAF) work with GoT through the Tanzania 
Agricultural Partnership (TAP). (ANSAF (ansaf.
tanzania@gmail.com) is an umbrella of international 
and local civil society organisations, focusing in 
particular on marginal and smallholder farmers). 
Defined as a Public-Private Partnership, TAP is also 
a member of SAGCOT, the Southern Agricultural 
Growth Corridor of Tanzania (see text). 
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227 Cooksey 2009. The issue is not that state intervention 
is ‘wrong’ a priori, but that it is likely to be vitiated 
by inefficiency and patronage in practice.
228 Promoting export horticulture requires a pro-active 
state, but one playing a coordination and facilitating 
rather than a directive role. See Cooksey 2011b.
229 See Policy Forum 2011; Chirimi 2011. 
230 Chirimi 2011.
231 DFID 2009. Setting budget commitment targets for 
agriculture ignores the obvious point that giving 
additional monies to inefficient and unaccountable 
bureaucracies is unlikely to have much impact on 
front-line services.  
232 Known as the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund. See: 
www.dfid.gov.uk/Working-with-DFID/Funding. 
233 Interview E, 07/02/11. President Kikwete led an 
official delegation to Norway in 2005.
234 SAGCOT 2010; Daily News Reporter 2011. SAGCOT 
is an activity under Kilimo Kwanza. Chaired by Salum 
Shamte of the TNBC, its new board of directors 
(October 2011) consists of five Tanzanians and ‘two 
members from the World Bank’(?). The WB was not 
one of SAGCOT’s original signatories, and its 
muscling in on the scene (with money for projects) 
may or may not, according to respondent A, spell 
the kiss of death for the initiative.  
235 DFID 2008. YARA have already received loans from 
the Norwegian Development Fund (Norfund) and 
is implementing projects in various African 
countries.
236 DFID 2008. YARA also stresses the importance of 
port efficiency in promoting agricultural imports 
and exports.
237 Leases for hundreds of thousands of acres of land-
-which no single company could hope to put to 
productive use--have already been signed. Redfern 
(2010) reviews the pros and cons of biofuel 
investments.
238 YARA’s wresting of significant market share for 
established commercial fertiliser imports from 
existing importers is an interesting development in 
this respect.
239 Given the controversial nature of global agribusiness, 
it is difficult not to sympathise with a policy favouring 
firm regulation of the trade and investment regimes 
to prevent the worst case scenarios happening. 
Such regulation, of course, is also vulnerable to the 
forces of patronage we have been discussing in this 
report. 
240 We are increasingly uncomfortable with ‘policy 
formulation and implementation’ as privileged 
objects of study. A more satisfactory formulation 
would start from the totality of effects on ‘agriculture’, 
including state, commercial and non-state actors. 
Policies and their implementation would constitute 
sub-sets of these effects. 
241 Did respondent use more/less/same amount of 
chemical fertiliser last year (2006) compared to the 
year before?
242 Green et al. 1980: 94-5.
243 Cowan 2004:24. Emphasis added. 
244 Stein 2008, Part 1. 
245 The WB rates countries on their capacity to absorb 
loans effectively. Until recently, Tanzania was in the 
top category, justifying new loans worth up to USD 
400 million p.a. The rating has since declined. 
246 Informant B, Email 25/03/11.
247 Minot and Benson (2009) provide a reasoned critique 
of input subsidies that is compatible with a 
‘pro-market’ position.
248 A recent World Bank review found that little of the 
political analysis undertaken by its own and other 
agencies’ researchers has been operationalised in 
projects (WB 2011. ‘Use of political economy analysis 
in projects’). 
249 Ellis and Mdoe 2002 quoted by Cooksey 2004.
250 Chabal and Daloz 1999.
251 The Economist 2002. Emphasis added.
252 Cooksey 2011e ‘Aid, Governance and Corruption 
Control: A Critical Assessment’, Crime, Law and Social 
Change, DOI: 10.1007/s10611-011-9359-5. 
253 Knack 2000. See also Bräutigam and Knack 2004. 
254 Kramer 2007:1.
255 Redfern 2003.
256 Mr Mramba was sacked by President Kikwete for his 
alleged involvement in a large scam, see Cooksey 
2011b.
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Appendix 1: Potential irrigation areas per region and DADP disbursements 2007
Region Existing area 
under irriga-
tion (ha)
Total 
potential 
area
Potential 
area for 
develop-
ment (ha)
DADP 
disbursement 
2007
DADP rank Region 
rank minus 
DADP rank
1 Morogoro 25,144 176,732 151,588 3,566,772,531 5 -4
2 Kilimanjaro 45,638 117,933 72,295 1,192,845,139 19 -17
3 Coast 1,133 58,755 57,622 5,581,021,640 3 0
4 Arusha 49,947 100,007 50,060 1,753,494,038 12 -8
4 Manyara 1,837,692,680 11 -7
6 Mbeya 35,239 79,257 44,018 1,353,278,531 17 -11
7 Rukwa 5,236 47,672 42,436 3,176,443,760 6 +1
8 Dodoma 3,608 43,689 40,081 7,380,463,532 1 +7
9 Tabora 2,591 34,880 32,289 1,630,687,658 13 -4
10 Mwanza 1,108 24,886 23,778 1,618,512,467 14 -4
11 Kigoma 3,420 22,530 19,110 1,010,691,355 18 -7
12 Iringa 5,539 23,335 17,796 2,446,865,137 9 +3
13 Kagera 15 17,166 17,151 1,234,626,591 18 -5
14 Mara 341 17,476 17,135 1,373,442,314 16 -2
15 Shinyanga 1,650 18,670 17,020 1,381,229,711 15 0
16 Mtwara 730 15,321 14,591 3,978,247,896 4 +12
17 Tanga 8,626 21,411 12,785 3,173,102,658 7 +10
18 Singida 525 11,840 11,315 1,967,572,521 10 +8
19 Lindi 1,231 9,358 8,127 2,957,684,423 8 +11
20 Ruvuma 198 7,850 7,652 6,846,696,431 2 +18
21 Dar 4 5,525 5,521 723,012,264 20 +1
Total 191,923 854,293 662,370 56,184,383,277 +/- 7
Source: Schram,  Rommert, Betty Mlingi, Gabriel M. Kalinga 2007. ‘Diagnostic Study on Capacity Building for the Implementation of 
the ASDP (Irrigation Component)’, April, citing NIMP 2002
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Appendix 2: Use of chemical fertiliser in 2006
Region
N=
Frequency of Use241 Income Group
Poorest  (%) Middle (%) Least Poor 
(%)
All (%)
Arusha
194
More 0 2 12 5
About the same 3 7 15 8
Less 0 5 7 4
Never Used 97 86 66 83
Tanga
362
More 0 0 3 1
About the same 0 1 4 1
Less 0 1 4 1
Never Used 100 98 89 96
Dar es Salaam
45
More 0 0 12 9
About the same 0 12 3 4
Less 0 0 0 0
Never Used 100 88 84 87
Lindi
190
More 0 1 3 1
About the same 0 3 0 1
Less 0 0 0 0
Never Used 100 96 97 98
Mtwara
307
More 0 1 0 0
About the same 0 4 8 3
Less 0 2 15 3
Never Used 100 93 77 93
Iringa
382
More 0 6 21 15
About the same 4 14 23 19
Less 19 34 29 29
Never Used 77 45 27 37
Singida
282
More 0 0 2 0
About the same 1 1 0 1
Less 0 2 2 1
Never Used 99 96 96 98
Rukwa
301
More 0 0 8 3
About the same 2 1 5 3
Less 2 5 8 6
Never Used 96 94 79 88
Shinyanga
458
More 1 2 0 1
About the same 1 2 7 3
Less 2 1 2 1
Never Used 96 95 91 95
Mwanza
316
More 0 1 2 1
About the same 0 3 1 2
Less 0 4 9 5
Never Used 100 91 88 92
All
N=2,837 Never Used 98 90 69 86
Source: REPOA 2007
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Appendix 3: Allocation of subsidised fertiliser vouchers, Iringa 2008/09
District 2008 2009 Agricultural 
Households
Iringa (Rural) 17,000 55,000 52,714
Njombe  (Rural) 27,800 51,000 78,772
Njombe (Urban) 26,800 51,000
Mufindi 25,800 49,660 56,766
Kilolo 21,700 34,000 39,549
Ludewa 7,700 22,000 24,527
Makete 6,200 18,000 25,227
Iringa (Urban) 3,000 2,140 1,162
136,000 282,800 278,717
Source: MAFS input data-base 2011
Appendix 4: Aid to Tanzanian agriculture in historical perspective
In 1980, observers noted the rapid growth of external 
aid to Tanzanian agriculture:
‘Since 1974 a positive blizzard of 
programmes (by crop, input and region) has 
emerged and presumably has had some 
positive effect on output. … The … build-up 
of new programmes … in some cases 
appears to have suffered from lack of 
coherence, priority setting and internal 
contradictions.’ 242
Since Tanzania’s independence 50 years ago, WB 
agricultural projects have systematically failed to achieve 
their objectives. Pre-adjustment WB lending to Tanzania 
contributed to the failure of ujamaa and the external 
debt that ensued. A WB study of aid effectiveness in 
Tanzania: 
‘concluded that between 1967 and 1987 
donors provided US$15bn of support to 
what the Bank called a “poorly thought out 
socialist experiment”, even noting that 
senior World Bank officials indulged the 
Tanzanian government without seeking to 
explain what was realistic and feasible in 
terms of economic development.’ 243
There is still a widespread view that poor countries’ 
development problems are in large part the result of the 
(forced?) implementation of (implicitly or explicitly 
‘wrong’) IFI policy prescriptions.  For example, Stein (2008) 
sees structural adjustment as based on a melange of 
neoclassical and new institutional economics theories, 
with the latter interpreted to support a market-led, 
minimum state role development strategy.244 The 
assumption here is that the implementation of these 
policies has helped to create and/or perpetuate the 
problems they are attempting to solve. The evidence of 
this research suggests that the WB’s guiding theoretical 
position since the 1980s has had little practical relevance 
for agricultural projects on the ground. One would not 
guess, for example, that the WB favours a market-led 
development strategy from the nature of its support to 
ASDP and NAIVS, in which the private sector is accorded 
a dependent and secondary role. Though private 
contractors presumably do well out of irrigation 
construction work and stockists/retailers out of input 
distribution, and NMB out of managing voucher finances, 
private sector interests did not obviously influence the 
development of these projects. 
This analysis is consistent with the view that policy, 
institutional and capacity constraints on project 
implementation are regularly overlooked in the interest 
of getting new projects off the ground and meeting 
disbursement targets.245 One colleague made the 
following observation: ‘...the projects you are reviewing 
... often carry so [many] unrealistic assumptions and the 
need to burn donor money overrules prudence.’ 246
Challenging the formal neo-liberalism of structural 
adjustment are concerns with poverty reduction and 
food security, which suggest support for both public 
goods (research, extension) and private goods (input 
vouchers) provision by the state, with little or no concern 
for private sector involvement. But at the same time, the 
WB and others have criticised input voucher schemes 
on both theoretical and practical grounds, so one could 
legitimately challenge WB support for just such a scheme, 
given that there are numerous alternatives.247 Non-policy 
factors come into play at all stages of the project cycle.
Stein also points to the compatibility of a neo-liberal 
position and ‘good governance’, including corruption 
control, as key strands guiding WB lending. Yet ‘good 
governance’ has little substantive application when it is 
defined as a separate ‘sector’, with its own projects, rather 
than being mainstreamed in all sectors.248 What would 
an analysis of agricultural ministries’ and allied agencies’ 
governance practices reveal? We do not know, since no 
such analysis has ever been attempted. Do governance 
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shortcomings help explain the apparent inability of the 
state to deliver public goods in general and in agriculture 
in particular?
At the local level, the quality of governance will 
influence how policies are implemented (or not) implying 
that even well formulated and adequately funded policies 
may be undermined. Writing before MKUKUTA and ASDP, 
Ellis and Mdoe (2002) noted that: 
‘The PRS [Poverty Reduction Strategy] needs 
to identify, evaluate, and seek to diminish those 
factors in the institutional and fiscal environment 
at local levels that are discouraging and inimical 
to trade, investment, r isk-taking and 
enterprise.’ 
These authors also highlight: ‘the risk that 
decentralisation will lead to an escalation of predatory 
behaviour on the part of local councils rather than more 
accountable government and better service provision.’ 
249
Silence on institutional governance issues on both 
sides of the aid equation suggests the presence of 
a powerful implicit alliance to defend a lending-
borrowing status quo that could otherwise constitute 
an issue of major public concern.  Similar logic could 
help explain the continuation of Tanzania’s triple A status 
as a borrower long after evidence of ruinous political 
corruption and rent-seeking had emerged to shatter 
the ‘good governance’ reputation that the country was 
beginning to enjoy. This is not an exclusively WB problem, 
of course. In the absence of ‘counter-hegemonic’ forces, 
donors and recipients like GoT will continue to conspire 
in the production of projects destined more often than 
not to fail.   
Finally, general problems of aid dependency and 
effectiveness are also relevant for our agricultural 
theme. In a nutshell, aid routinely undermines the 
state institutions it is supposed to ‘strengthen’ while 
providing substantial resources that are diverted into 
local patronage networks. 
Chabal and Daloz (1999) argue that the misuse 
of foreign aid in the pursuit of political objectives is 
one of the major features of ‘aid dependency.250 The 
Economist (2002) quotes the WB’s estimate that: ‘there 
are 28 countries that are home to 500m people, mostly 
in sub-Saharan Africa, where aid is unlikely to work.’251 
Cooksey (2011e) claims that the diversification of aid 
sources and increased volumes of aid transfers since 
the turn of the century have heightened competition 
between agencies for market share and reduced the 
chances that aid can be effectively coordinated.252 At the 
same time, aid dependency has weakened governance in 
a number of ways that are relevant to our overall theme. 
For example, Knack claims that:
‘Aid dependence can undermine 
institutional quality by weakening 
accountability, encouraging rent seeking 
and corruption, fomenting conflict over 
control of aid funds, siphoning off scarce 
talent from the bureaucracy, and alleviating 
pressures to reform inefficient policies and 
institutions.’ ... ‘analyses of cross-country 
data provide evidence that higher aid levels 
erode the quality of governance, as 
measured by indexes of bureaucratic quality, 
corruption, and the rule of law...’ 253
Kramer argues that the extent of corrupt 
practices in international aid projects is:
 ‘too often underestimated’. ‘... contractors 
and honest project officials ... complain 
(privately of course) about the pervasive, 
systemic corruption and the naiveté of aid 
organizations that seem unable or unwilling 
to recognize the problem.254
Although the WB audits its projects thoroughly, 
many are not convinced that this helps prevent fraud 
and corruption. Financial audits do not look at value for 
money (see text, Box 2). More important, most project 
audits take place at ministerial level, ignoring what 
happens once money is transferred to lower levels, as 
with small-scale irrigation and input subsidies discussed 
above. We suspect that clientelism and inefficiency are 
the norm, not the exception.
In February 2003, British overseas 
development secretary Clare Short:
‘criticised the failure of billions of dollars 
of development assistance to alleviate 
poverty in Tanzania. [She] criticised the 
money she believed had been wasted 
through the European Union’s aid budget 
in recent years, complaining that huge sums 
had been lost to corruption.’ 255
On the same occasion, Tanzania’s Minister 
of Finance Basil Mramba confided:
‘I’ve seen a lot of aid money. But I’ve not 
seen development with that aid. In the past 
five years, I’ve seen investment in Tanzania. 
And now I see change. Aid has not got us 
anywhere; aid should never be more than 
the icing on the cake.256
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